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THE EXOSKELETON OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
WHY THE BREADTH, DEPTH, AND LONGEVITY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MATTERS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Sanne H. Knudsen*
Environmental law is pragmatic, inevitable, and intentional. In the
aggregate, the numerous federal environmental statutes are not simply a
patchwork of ad hoc responses or momentary political breakthroughs to
isolated public health problems and resource concerns. Together, they are
a group of repeated, legislatively-backed commitments to embrace selfrestraint for self-preservation.
Self-restraint and discipline are the essence of environmental law.
Indeed, if one studies the patterns and repeated choices in environmental
law’s many statutory texts, one can start to appreciate environmental
law’s indispensable role in society: it serves as an enduring
“exoskeleton,” a sort of protective armor created over time to protect
ourselves from collective action problems that inevitably arise in a world
of biophysical limits.
Appreciating the exoskeleton—that is, appreciating the broader
statutory and historical context in which these laws exist—has
implications for the interpretation and implementation of environmental
statutes. It has implications for the weight that regulators and jurists ought
to give enacted purpose statements when interpreting the laws, for
reviewing agency decisions made in the face of scientific uncertainty, and
for the robust review that ought to be given to agency inaction.
Absent a corrected understanding of environmental law, one that
aligns the fundamental purpose of the laws with its implementation, the
full fervor of Congressional commitment to self-restraint will continue to
be met with judicial microscoping, apathy, and sidestepping.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no particular revelation to say that environmental law is a complex area
informed by technical expertise, ever-evolving scientific understandings, and
detailed statutes. Unfortunately, that complexity can at times hide what ought to be
in plain sight—the inevitable, indispensable, and intentional role of environmental
law in a functioning society. What’s more, the implementation and interpretation of
environmental law suffers when regulators and jurists lose sight of its essence.
To unpack the essence of environmental law, we might start with three simple
and connected truths. First, the Earth does not have an endless supply of timber,
clean water, breathable air, iron ore, or fossil fuels.1 And of course, the Earth’s
capacity to assimilate waste from all manner of industrial complexes and

1

In his examination of how natural abundance has shaped American society,
environmental historian Donald Worster draws on the work of Walter Prescott Webb to
emphasize “the big and hard-to-deny point that Nature puts limits on humans.” DONALD
WORSTER, SHRINKING THE EARTH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN ABUNDANCE 35
(2016). As Worster recounts, in Webb’s 1952 writing of the Great Frontier, Webb cautioned
that “[t]he land has only so much to offer . . . There is a limit beyond which we cannot
go . . . .” Id.
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consumption is also bounded; waste and pollution must go somewhere and that
somewhere has a finite ability to receive waste.2
It is because the Earth is limited as both a source of natural capital and a sink
for waste absorption that environmental laws exist.3 In fact, the instrument of law is
uniquely qualified to set limits of scale and ensure that the cumulative impacts of
individual behavior do not exceed the productive or absorptive capacities of nature’s
bounty.4 Ideally, laws allow market forces to allocate within but not beyond the
bounds of nature’s capacity.5
Second, while environmentalism has a reputation for lofty ideals and an almost
religious devotion to nature,6 environmental law is a rational and pragmatically
indispensable element of a society interested in self-preservation. Even a freemarket advocate like Richard Epstein didn’t mince words when he explained that
“[i]f no one can breathe or eat, then markets too will quickly die of asphyxiation.
The only way, therefore, to avoid the catastrophe is to recognize that a system of
unrestrained externalities, unrestrained pollution, and unrestrained destruction is
going to lead to that unacceptable outcome.”7 At the start of her book Nature’s Trust,
Mary Christina Wood is equally dark and direct: “any government that fails to
2
HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 7–8 (1996) (explaining that by accepting the economy as a subsystem within
the environment, “we move from ‘empty-world’ economics to ‘full-world’ economics—
from a world where inputs to and outputs from the economy are unconstrained, to a world in
which they are increasingly constrained by the depletion and pollution of a finite
environment”).
3
See id. at 17 (“[F]ree institutions include not only the institution of individual freedom
in the competitive marketplace (freedom from monopoly), but also the social, collective
freedom to democratically enact rules for the common good . . . [T]he market solution to the
efficient allocation problem presupposes a political solution to the problems of sustainable
scale and just distribution.”); id. at 13–14 (“There are two prior problems that have to be
solved politically as the precondition for the market to work [to solve the problem of efficient
allocation of resources]. We must politically and socially limit the total scale of resource
throughput for key resources to a level that is sustainable. . . . Second, the rights to deplete
or pollute up to the scale limit are no longer free good, but valuable assets. . . . The just
distribution of initial ownership has to be settled socially.”).
4
See WORSTER, supra note 1, at 68–69 (concluding, in the context of a case study on
the failures of fisheries in Nantucket to appreciate the limits of natural abundance, that
“[w]hales were saved only by the passage of laws and the exercise of moral restraint”).
5
See DALY, supra note 2, at 52 (noting that a “tradeable pollution permits scheme . . .
is a beautiful example of the independence and proper relationship among allocation,
distribution, and scale”).
6
See generally THOMAS R. DUNLOP, FAITH IN NATURE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AS
RELIGIOUS QUEST (2004).
7
Richard A. Epstein, Regulation—and Contract—in Environmental Law, 93 W. VA. L.
REV. 859, 861 (1991); see also id. (“No matter how strong a devotee you are of the free
market[—]and I’m a pretty strong one[—]if you talk first about contract and second about
regulation in environmental law, then you have got the order backwards. In terms of relevant
significance, you have to talk about regulation first and contracts second.”).
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protect its natural resources consigns its citizens to misery[—]and often death.”8 In
fact, environmental laws are so commonplace that one might view them as
inevitable—they are simply tools that rational actors would predictably invoke to
give order and stability to a limited set of resources.
Third, environmental laws exist as a result of intentional choices—they reflect
repeated, democratic decisions over a long period of time. They choose self-restraint
in the face of powerful, countervailing individual interests.9 In other words, the
existence of environmental law is not a fluke. The values advanced by environmental
laws are not accidental; they are intentional. In that sense, environmental laws are
more than a pragmatic need for survival or technocratic reflections of biophysical
limits.10 They are also normatively-driven choices so that future generations inherit
something better than a more polluted planet with fewer resources.11 They embody
a deliberate commitment to the future prosperity of a nation. They give shape and
promise to a fundamental American ideal: that of prosperity in perpetuity. They do
so through self-restraint and self-discipline in pursuit of collective preservation. That
is the essence of environmental law.
Still, the values that animate environmental law are not embraced at the level
one would expect if one were familiar with the breadth, depth, and longevity of its
legislative text. Professor William H. Rodgers, author of the leading treatise on
environmental law and well-known sage in the field, laments the “‘decline’ in the
legal elevation of the environmental values that were within reach in the early
1970s.”12 This decline, he notes, is curious given that “these values linger on in the
legislative text . . . .”13 Likewise, in his book Environment in the Balance, Johnathan
Cannon studies the Supreme Court’s amenability to environmental values in
statutory interpretation.14 Cannon observes that the U.S. Supreme Court largely
embraced environmental values at the start of the modern environmental movement
but “has since distanced itself and adopted a more neutral and often even skeptical
8

MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE 6 (2014).
9
See infra Part I; infra note 167 and accompanying text.
10
Cf. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 16–17 (2010) (arguing that the questions at the heart of
environmental law cannot be answered by the purported objectivity of welfare economics
because environmental law is normative in nature).
11
The idea that environmental law is a manifestation of a deeper cultural response to
declining natural resources is also consistent with historian Donald Worster’s telling of the
settling of America. See, e.g., WORSTER, supra note 1, at 8 (“Beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century a growing number of citizens began taking their country’s ecological shrinkage
seriously and launched an ambitious and successful movement to conserve natural resources,
reduce their waste, and preserve natural beauty.”).
12
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW § 5:25 (2d ed.), Westlaw ENVIRLAW (database updated Nov. 2021).
13
Id.
14
JOHNATHAN Z. CANNON, ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALANCE: THE GREEN MOVEMENT
AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2015).
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stance in its environmental decisions.”15 Richard Lazarus has made similar
observations: “The Supreme Court’s attitude towards environmental law during the
past three decades has generally been marked by apathy, but with the Justices
exhibiting increasing signs of skepticism and some hostility.”16
And so it seems, we need to ask: If environmental law as an act of self-restraint
is so foundational to an ordered society, why does environmental law spend so much
time playing defense against the rhetoric that suggests economic growth or
individual freedom is undermined by environmental regulation?17 In a field where
high-stakes problems are daunting and nature’s laws are unforgiving, why isn’t the
precaution built into environmental laws more fully embraced?18 Why is regulatory
inaction to systemic environmental harm inadequately checked by judicial review?19
Why do we keep retelling the same story—of the irreparable, costly harms that
plague the health and security of our children because the laws that exist have not
been implemented by agencies with the tenacity they demand?20
15

Id.
Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 771 (2000) [Lazarus, Restoring What’s
Environmental]; see also J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the
Supreme Court, 36 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 487, 490 (2012).
17
See KYSAR, supra note 10, at 1 (“By now, the story of modern American
environmental law has been redacted into a familiar script,” one in which environmental
regulation needs to be justified “from a scientific risk assessment and tailored to reflect only
the level of environmental or human health protection that is acceptable in light of
corresponding costs.”); CANNON, supra note 14, at 24–25 (describing the tension between
environmentalists and welfare economics and highlighting Robert Nelson’s conclusion in
The New Holy Wars that the “epochal struggle between [environmentalism and economics]
is unavoidable”).
18
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1004, 1008 (2003) (describing the principle as “unhelpful” and “paralyzing”).
19
See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 60–61 (2004) (dismissing
the claim by characterizing it as government inaction, despite ongoing and irreparable
damage to lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management, and despite a statutory
command directing the agency to avoid unnecessary and undue degradation of the lands in
question).
20
For an example of how irreparable harms result from regulatory inaction, consider
the story of chlorpyrifos, a widely used crop pesticide regulated under the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act. Despite concerns raised in a 2007 petition for review over neurological
impacts to children as a result of in utero exposure to chlorpyrifos residue on food, and
despite the EPA’s own science concluding that the existing tolerance levels were not
protective enough, EPA delayed making a final, and therefore judicially reviewable decision,
until 2019. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Regan, 996 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.
2021). By the time the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in a 2021 opinion that the
EPA’s refusal to regulate was arbitrary and capricious, id. at 697, 14 years had passed since
the initial petition and an unknown number of children had been put at risk. This, despite that
a federal law unequivocally places the burden on the EPA to show safety as a precondition
to setting residue tolerances. Id. at 678. See also WOOD, supra note 8, at 74 (critiquing agency
16
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Again, at first glance, the answer may be that the laws are complex; that the
collective action and public health problems that they address are complicated.21
Indeed, they are. The answer may also be that the agencies who implement the laws
are given too much discretion, which then hamstrings the judiciary in its ability to
give meaningful effect to the underlying purpose of the laws.22 There is truth to this
too.
But the problem may also be simpler—that, in dissecting their complexity and
microscoping their details, those who implement and interpret environmental laws
have gotten lost in the nuance and failed to appreciate that restraint is a feature, not
a bug, of environmental law. That feature is one that Americans have repeatedly
embraced through legislation time and again.
By considering environmental law as a series of repeated choices made over a
long historical arc, this Article offers a corrected understanding of environmental
law. Namely, it advances a view that is at once unapologetic and unifying. By
looking to the text of the statutory commands, individually and in the aggregate, by
considering their collective regulatory reach and vast legal infrastructure, and by
considering the historical arc of which their passage is a part, one might start to
appreciate that this body of law serves a distinctive and purposeful role in society—
as an “exoskeleton” of sorts. In biology, an exoskeleton is a “rigid external covering
for the body in some invertebrate animals, especially arthropods, providing both
support and protection.”23 That exoskeleton is a useful evolutionary development
necessary for species survival.24 Similarly, one can imagine environmental laws, in
the aggregate, as forming an armor that society uses to protect itself from the
biophysical realities of nature and the consequences of collective use. The
intentionality of that armor is reflected in the depth, breadth, and longevity of
environmental law.

use of discretion to undermine environmental law and asserting that “some agencies use
technical discretion as free rein to contravene statutory intent”).
21
See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38–41 (2004)
[LAZARUS, MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
22
WOOD, supra note 8, at 6–7.
23
Exoskeleton, in CONCISE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Erin McKean, Constance
Baboukis, Carol Braham, Alan Hartley, Christine A. Lindberg, Johanna Baboukis, Orin
Hargraves, Archie Hobson, Marina Padakis & Grant Barrett eds., 2006).
24
Darja Obradovic Wagner & Per Aspenberg, Where Did Bone Come From? 82 ACTA
ORTHOPAEDICA 393, 394 (2011) (Though it also had drawbacks, the “exoskeleton added
speed to the evolution of animal life in general and created opportunities for animals to
expand their activity radius by using calcified extremities and protection shields . . . .”). But
see Anne Holden, Exoskeleton Evolution, CAL. ACAD. OF SCIS. (Mar. 1, 2011),
https://www.calacademy.org/explore-science/exoskeleton-evolution [https://perma.cc/6BD
3-56XR] (“Despite arthropods’ prevalence and diversity, scientists still disagree on when
their most distinctive feature—the exoskeleton—evolved.”) Cf. Neil Bowdler, Rise of the
Human Exoskeletons, BBC (Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology26418358 [https://perma.cc/9E9L-6UAS] (“Robotic or mechanical exoskeletons could offer
humans the kind of protection, support and strength they afford in nature.”).
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For regulators and jurists, the intentionality embodied by this idea of an
exoskeleton has at least three foundational implications: (1) the enacted purpose
statements contained in environmental statutes deserve a consistent and weighted
role in statutory interpretation; (2) the use of scaffolding and reinforcing regulatory
commands often seen in environmental statutes suggest jurists ought to place a
thumb on the scale of precaution when reviewing agency decisions; and (3) the
underlying values of restraint suggest that regulatory inaction by agencies ought to
be met with more skepticism than it currently receives.
For environmental laws to come into existence, legislators had to come together
and choose against the status quo of unbridled consumption.25 And they did that,
time and time again. In fact, the United States was, for a long time, heralded as a
leader in environmental protection because of the boldness of its laws in prioritizing
human and ecological health above undisciplined and short-term growth.26 When it
enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973,27 Congress intended “to halt
and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”28 When it
25

See KYSAR, supra note 10, at 116 (“[D]emocratically enacted environmental laws
seek to protect certain interests from shortsighted destruction by land development,
pollution, and other potentially harmful activities. . . . [W]e seek to enshrine the collective
values and aims of our better selves . . . .”). In suggesting that the weight given to values
encoded in environmental laws ought to carry weight by virtue of their emergence from a
rigorous process of legislative adoption, one can finds support in the principle of institutional
settlement. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 722 (1991) (“The
principle of institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly
arrived at result of duly established procedures [for making decisions] of this kind ought to
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed.”
(alterations in original) (quoting 1 HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT K. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4–5 (tent. ed.
1958))). Still, one ought to be cautious in suggesting that the principle of institutional
settlement avoids the problem of determining the driving values of the underlying statute. Id.
at 723–24.
26
See Maria Ivanova & Daniel C. Esty, Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global
Environmental Governance, 28 SAIS REV. INT’L AFFS. 57, 69 (2008) (“In the 1970s and
1980s, new international environmental organizations were created and old ones reformed,
international environmental treaties were initiated and immediately signed, partnerships
were forged, and funding mobilized. Moreover, U.S. commitment internationally translated
into consistent domestic compliance with international environmental law. At the core of
these achievements, lay individual and collective leadership and a vision for the United
States as a uniting force in a divided world.”); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven
Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1009, 1011 (1994) (“NEPA is the most frequently copied and most frequently cited of
all U.S. domestic environmental laws.”).
27
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544).
28
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978); see also id. at 194 (“Congress
has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a
policy which it described as ‘institutionalized caution.’”).
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enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972,29 Congress aggressively announced a vision
where America’s waterways would be free from pollutant discharges by 198530 and
that a cost-blind, health-based approach would boldly prohibit “the discharge of
toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.”31 Similar commitments to ecological preservation
and public health lie at the heart of the Clean Air Act,32 the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA),33 the Safe Drinking Water Act,34 the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA),35 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),36 the
29

Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1389).
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
31
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3). For a thorough history of the Clean Water Act’s approach to
regulating toxic pollutants and for a description of the aggressive, health-based approach
contained in the 1972 amendments and then changed in the 1977 amendments, see Oliver A.
Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ENV’T L. REP.
10528, 10533 (1991); see also id. at 10532 (discussing the bold aspirations of the Clean
Water Act, and noting that “[t]hese findings of Congress were no accident. They were the
product of nearly two years of hearing and debate. . . . The shift in approach was more than
mechanical; it was ideological. The ‘use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste
treatment system’ was, henceforth, ‘unacceptable’”).
32
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (declaring that one of the purposes of the Act is “to protect
and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”); 136 CONG. REC. 34989 (1990)
(statement of Rep. John Dingell) (“It has been my privilege as a Member of Congress to
participate in the writing of every clean air bill ever passed. None of those previous measures
remotely approaches the complexity or comprehensiveness of the bill we are considering
today. . . . This bill’s impact will be felt in virtually every aspect of human endeavor and
nearly every economic activity. . . . We will also be fulfilling our responsibility to the
American people who have told us that they are willing to make some sacrifices in pursuit
of a cleaner environment.”).
33
For a detailed review of TSCA’s history and Congress’s intent to tackle health threats
resulting from unchecked chemicals, see David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History
and Key Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U.
J. L. & POL’Y 333, 340 (2010); see also id. at 337 (discussing then-EPA Administrator
Russell Train’s pronouncement that TSCA was “one of the most important pieces of
preventive medicine legislation ever passed by Congress”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting another source); see also Sanne H. Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk,
101 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2367–71 (2017) (discussing TSCA’s broad authorities with the
theoretical capacity for regulating even cumulative risk).
34
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(C). When prioritizing which unregulated contaminants to
develop national drinking water standards for, Congress directs the EPA to “select
contaminants that present the greatest public health concern.” Id.
35
16 U.S.C. § 1600(6) (“[T]he Forest Service, by virtue of its statutory authority for
management of the National Forest System, . . . has both a responsibility and an opportunity
to be a leader in assuring that the Nation maintains a natural resource conservation posture
that will meet the requirements of our people in perpetuity.”).
36
See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b) (finding that waste disposal “can present a danger to human
health and the environment,” among other concerns); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 3
(1976) (explaining that the “overriding concern” of Congress when drafting the legislation
30
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Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA),37 the Wilderness Act,38 and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).39
Consider too that these laws—many of which are nearly half a century old—
reflect the conviction of the people, the insights of scholars, and the bold leadership
of lawmakers. The laws come from the courage of scientists like Rachel Carson who
embraced the role of evidence-based advocates.40 They grow out of grassroots
organization: the coming together of professors and students, scientists and soccer
moms, anglers and hippies to elevate environmental consciousness to a movement
that would give Earth its own day in 1971.41 Together, these laws more fully capture
the teachings of classical economic thought, paying homage to the oft-ignored
cautions that economic growth must inevitably give way to the limits of natural
capital.42 Moreover, these laws embody a decades-long cultural shift away from
was “the effect on the population and the environment of the disposal of discarded hazardous
wastes––those which by virtue of their composition or longevity are harmful, toxic or
lethal”).
37
While CERCLA is notorious for its lack of clarity, see John Copeland Nagle,
CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court
has distilled CERCLA’s purpose as follows: “In 1980, [CERCLA] to address the serious
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution. The Act seeks to promote the
timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts
[are] borne by those responsible for the contamination.” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140
S. Ct. 1335, 1345 (2020) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Wilderness Act of 1964, § 2(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (proclaiming that the wilderness
areas “shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such
manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness . . . .”).
39
The congressional declared purposes of NEPA are “[t]o declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;
to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.” 42 U.S.C § 4321.
40
See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); see also Frank Graham, Jr., Fifty
Years After Silent Spring Attacks on Science Continue, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 21, 2012),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/fifty_years_after_rachel_carsons_silent_spring_assacult_on_
science_continues [https://perma.cc/V9QD-WAQS] (“When Silent Spring was published in
1962, author Rachel Carson was subjected to vicious personal assaults that had nothing do
with the science or the merits of pesticide use.”).
41
See ADAM ROME, THE GENIUS OF EARTH DAY: HOW A 1970 TEACH-IN
UNEXPECTEDLY MADE THE FIRST GREEN GENERATION 10 (2013) (“In the course of the 1950s
and 1960s, many liberal Democrats, scientists, middle-class women, young critics of
American institutions, and conservationists become more concerned about environmental
issues. Though the activists in those groups did not become a concerted force until Earth Day
brought them together, they made Earth Day possible.”).
42
DALY, supra note 2, at 23 (“The biophysical limits to growth arise from three
interrelated conditions: finitude, entropy, and ecological interdependence.”); WORSTER,
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America’s reflexive allegiance to “uncontrolled growth.”43 They embody a
collective decision to shape a future America on something other than ad hoc
individual choices.44 In the end, the values embodied in the laws have been
remarkably durable.45
The point is, if we study the history of American settlement as told by Donald
Worster,46 and the cultural movement behind Earth Day as examined by Adam
Rome;47 if we consider the maturing philosophical relationship between man and
nature as described by Jedediah Purdy;48 and if we take seriously the complete
teachings of classical economists and the work of Herman Daly,49 we start to see
environmental law not as a sideshow, a product of a bygone era, or a disrupting
nuisance to economic progress. Rather, we see it as an indispensable and intentional
part of the societal blueprint for how to keep America prosperous and protect the
quality of life for current and future generations of Americans.50 In other words, we
might start to appreciate environmental law as a sort of exoskeleton.
With all that in mind, Part I takes up the first major task of this Article—to
show that an exoskeleton exists by examining environmental laws in the aggregate.
It considers their comprehensive regulatory reach, extensive legal infrastructure,
enacted purpose statements, and regulatory choices to show how the exoskeleton is
the culmination of a pattern of choices codified over time. Even if no one set out to
supra note 1, at 41–56 (explaining that Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nation’s was as much a
commentary on limits on abundance; and similarly discussing the works of various classical
economists like David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Stanley Jevons, and Thomas Malthus, all
of whom cautioned that resources are not infinite and neither then is economic productivity).
43
See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945–1970, at 6–7 (2009) (“Environmental law did not appear in a
revolutionary moment of intense national creativity after 1969. A slower, more complicated,
evolutionary process of legal change laid down environmental law’s foundation before the
first Earth Day.”); WORSTER, supra note 1, at 107 (“The rise of the conservation movement,
in contrast, suggested that a substantial number of Americans were beginning to question
that linear progression and to look for more than a future of endless and assured wealth. . . .
They sought not an end to all growth but an end to uncontrolled and unlimited growth, which
spoiled the earth for their children or themselves.”).
44
Cf. KYSAR, supra note 10, at 101 (arguing that the “individually inscribed” interests
reflected in the welfare-economic approach to environmental law “work to obscure much of
the reason behind publicly enacted environmental, health and safety laws,” which center on
“interests that arise on the collective level”).
45
CANNON, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing social science studies evidencing that
“attitudes, beliefs, and values associated with environmentalism are measurably present and
durable among the American public”).
46
WORSTER, supra note 1.
47
ROME, supra note 41.
48
JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE (2015).
49
DALY, supra note 2.
50
See, e.g., WORSTER, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]he earth has been a powerful agent in
human history, both when it was replete with resources and when it could no longer offer the
old abundance.”).
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create an exoskeleton, which surely they did not, the result of many repeated
decisions to turn to law as a primary tool for setting bounds on waste and planning
for a future with bountiful natural resources has become exactly that—an
exoskeleton that serves to protect current and future generations. Over time that
exoskeleton has proven to be durable.
The second major task of this Article, taken up in Part II, is to show how an
understanding of the exoskeleton—that aggregate pattern of choices and
intentionality in repeated form—ought to shape judicial review. Overall,
appreciating the whole of the enterprise allows regulators and courts to make more
sophisticated decisions, ones that more consistently embrace the underlying values
of resource conservation that animate the individual statutes. In particular, the
exoskeleton has implications for the weight that regulators and jurists ought to give
enacted purpose statements when interpreting the laws, for reviewing agency
decisions made in the face of scientific uncertainty, and for the rigorous review that
ought to be given to agency inaction.
An astute reader might note that the sketch of environmental law’s exoskeleton,
as laid out so far, makes no distinction between natural resource laws (like the
National Forest Management Act or the Wilderness Act) and pollution control laws
(like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act). That is deliberate. While in
practice and in scholarship there is sometimes a divide between the domains of
natural resource management and pollution control regulation, the basis for those
distinctions is artificial if one considers the underlying biophysical necessity of
environmental law.51 Put in that light, natural resource laws simply deal with the
limits of the Earth’s capacity to serve as a source of raw materials whereas pollution
control laws simply deal with the Earth’s capacity to serve as a sink for waste from
industrial processes. Laws in both domains are responses to the limits of nature,
whether as a source or a sink. Laws in both domains are, at their core, acts of selfrestraint for the purposes of self-preservation—they reflect the eventual creation of
an exoskeleton that is but a natural, evolutionary impulse. Accordingly, in this
examination of the breadth, depth, and longevity of environmental laws, no
meaningful distinction is created in an exoskeleton that is meant to protect both the
productive and assimilative capacities of nature.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S EXOSKELETON—THE BREADTH, DEPTH,
AND TEXTUAL PATTERNS OF INTENTIONALITY
The conservation and public health values that animate environmental law are
not embraced at the level one would expect if one were familiar with the breadth,
51

For a discussion of natural resources law as a separate field, but also a recognition
that some case books have begun breaking down boundaries “in recognition of nature’s
seamlessness,” see Robert L. Fischman, What Is Natural Resources Law? 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. 717, 717–18 (2007); see also Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law
and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 664 (2008)
(“Dividing environmental law into its two subject-matter strands may hinder integrated
understanding and resolution of environmental problems.”).
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depth, and longevity of its many legislative texts. To address that shortcoming, this
Part examines the major federal environmental statutes in the aggregate—studying
their comprehensive regulatory reach, enacted purpose statements, and repeated
regulatory choices.
In the end, that examination illustrates what ought to be an obvious truth: as a
Nation we have chosen self-restraint,52 though not always and not necessarily
consistently. For a long time in American history, this was not the case. But
beginning in the postwar era of the 1940s53 and solidifying in the heyday of the
1970s Earth Day teach-ins,54 America chose to actively codify what conservationists
and enlightened economists had counseled for years; that is, in a world of finite
resources, the use and disposal of resources must be managed and conserved for
future prosperity.55 That repeated codification is more than random. Over time, the
repeat codifications form the exoskeleton of environmental law.
Admittedly, finding a unifying theme in environmental law is not an easy task
and is sure to be met with skepticism by even sympathetic observers. In fact, in the
quest to find cohesion in environmental law,56 some scholars have been successful57
52
The idea that environmental law is an act of self-preservation in the face of collective
action problems, while perhaps not so framed, is reflected in foundational works like Garrett
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons, an essay suggesting restraint through regulation as the
“prescription for the problem of overuse.” CANNON, supra note 14, at 16–17 (2015)
(discussing the tension between autonomy and collective restraint that undergirds the
environmental movement); see also Garrett Hardin, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). That theme was
picked up again by Jedidiah Purdy in his book After Nature, wherein he urges that “selfrestraint” is “exactly what environmental politics needs” in the future. See PURDY, supra note
48, at 256 (2015). Consistent with that insight, but taking it a step further, this work urges
that self-restraint is already a unifying value that environmental law has long injected into
the American experience.
53
See BROOKS, supra note 43, at 7–8.
54
See ROME, supra note 41, at 209.
55
See, e.g., DALY, supra note 2 passim; WORSTER, supra note 1 passim.
56
See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE &
ENV’T L. 93, 94 (1990); Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28
COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 63, 64–71 (2003); Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic
of Law and Environmental Values, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 234–35 (2003); David
Driesen, The Ends and Means of Pollution Control: Toward a Positive Theory of
Environmental Law, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 57, 58–64; Todd Aagaard, Environmental Law as
a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 222–26 (2010);
Sanne H. Knudsen, The Flip Side of Michigan v. EPA: Are Cumulative Impacts Centrally
Relevant? 1 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2018); Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution
Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 32 (1986).
57
Douglas Kysar has offered up the precautionary principle as a more suitable
guidepost than welfare economics for this sometimes illusive environmental ethic. KYSAR,
supra note 10, at 2–3. Mary Wood argues that the trust principles underlying environmental
law transcend its statutes and exist as a co-constitutional check on government-sanctioned
resource degradation. WOOD, supra note 8, at 14–17. David Driesen looked for a positive
theory of environmental law in regulatory choices and found varying degrees of normative
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while others have not.58 Most poignantly, Dan Tarlock questions whether there is a
“there there” in environmental law and concludes that there is not, even if there
should be.59 Still others skip the search for unifying ethics and focus instead on the
wisdom of various objective frameworks and regulatory choices as serving
individual statutory commands for resource protection.60 There are even those who

commitments. Driesen, supra note 56, at 58. In his book After Nature, Jedediah Purdy
reaches beyond law and identifies four major animating philosophies of the human-nature
relationship during the settlement of the United States. PURDY, supra note 48, at 31–45.
58
E.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law? 19 J. LAND
USE & ENV’T LAW 213, 217–18 (2004). Alyson Flournoy, searching for an environmental
ethic, has identified that “[o]ne might take the volume of law, as many people do, as proof
that our society shares some set of values or norms governing human interactions with the
environment, what we might call an ‘environmental ethic.’” Flournoy, supra note 56, at 65.
She then rebutted this point, arguing that “despite this impressive consensus and legacy, it is
not clear that environmental laws do reflect any clearly articulated ethic that should be called
environmental.” Id. at 66. Similarly, Eric Freyfogle, a notable champion of community
orientations to land use generally and private property specifically, has remarked “[t]ry as
we might, we cannot piece together Congress’s pronouncements into a coherent moral order,
or even into a premeditated vision of ecological well-being.” Eric Freyfogle, The Ethical
Strands of Environmental Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 840 (1994). Todd Aagaard too has
explored the very idea of environmental law as a legal field and concluded that there are “no
core principles that unify all of substantive environmental law doctrine.” Aagaard, supra
note 56, at 226; see also David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 7 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 619, 621, 624–25 (1994) (“[E]nvironmental law is not a discipline, because
it lacks the professional consensus on a coherent internal organization of materials a
discipline requires.”); see also Tracy Hester, Robert Percival, Irma Russell, Victor Flatt &
Joel Mintz, Restating Environmental Law, 40 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 4 (2015) (“Other
scholars have also questioned whether the entire field of U.S. environmental law remains too
immature and undeveloped to benefit from a comprehensive Restatement . . . .”). For a
concise description of the literature on whether the Supreme Court has approached
environmental law as a separate field, see Michael Burger, Environmental
Law/Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9 (2013).
59
By looking for a “there there” Tarlock is seeking a unifying substantive principle in
environmental law. See Tarlock, supra note 58, at 217–18. Tarlock offers up principles that
could guide environmental law but argues, in its current form, environmental law is better
defined by process than substance. Id. at 219–20.
60
Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore, for example, urge the utility of cost-benefit
analysis as an objective framework for resolving the inevitable trade-offs at the heart of
environmental resource disputes. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008). In fact, Revesz and Livermore have gone even
further at times, arguing that cost-benefit analysis would actually serve environmental goals
better than the seemingly more directly value-laden health-based standards. Richard L.
Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1258–64 (2014).
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question the wisdom of regulation as the appropriate path towards environmental
quality.61
It is fair to say that scholars are all over the map in their quest to untangle the
Gordian knot of how to create a society that balances individual freedom with
collective restraint such that nature can continue to nurture. Indeed, the human
energy devoted to untangling that knot is part of a long history and itself a testament
to a collective endeavor. One might say, if there is no “there there,”62 then why are
we here and how come the path is so worn?
Ultimately, the view of environmental law advanced here aligns with those
scholars who urge that a common animating environmental ethic exists and is an
essential part of legal discourse.63 To that end, this Article stands firmly in agreement
with Richard Lazarus who urges that environmental values “should be entitled to

61

While recognizing a “collective concern with nature” as a feature of societies capable
of a long-term view, Epstein nonetheless urges that the answers to resolving use conflicts lie
outside the realm of regulation entirely and ought to be resolved through private law. See
Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern
Environmental Movement Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2015) (“I
think that the conventional account seriously overstates the case for comprehensive
regulation to deal with these environmental issues. There is indeed a real need for such
agencies, but also an equal need to confine their substantive operation so it conforms to the
set of common law entitlements as fashioned through the law of nuisance and kindred
areas.”); see also Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 923–25 (1999) (“In short, many who care
about the environment are deeply concerned about the failings of federal regulatory efforts
and the environmental prospects if the federal regulatory engine continues along the same
track. . . . The common law, combined with various state-level controls, was doing a better
job addressing most environmental problems than the federal monopoly, which directed most
environmental policy for the last part of this century.”). But cf. James L. Huffman, Beware
of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 815 (2008) (“It was
widely agreed that the piecemeal methods of the common law could not make a dent in the
pervasive environmental problems facing the nation and the planet. But there was a small
band of contrarians who argued that the common law might still have some relevance to the
solving of environmental challenges.”).
62
This phrase comes from Tarlock, supra note 58, at 214.
63
In that way, this work answers the call of Holly Doremus, whose writings “encourage
a vigorous public discussion of the values served by our environmental policies” in order to
ensure the success of those policies. Doremus, supra note 56, at 234. This work espouses the
wisdom of Eric Freyfogle, who views a communitarian mindset to land use as the keystone
to meaningful stewardship of nature’s resources. Freyfogle, supra note 58, at 843 (“As we
seek to live more ethically and sensitively toward the land, we will likely come to understand
that land-use rules are not simply matters for each person to decide separately. We will view
them as matters of community concern, in much the same way that issues of murder and rape
are matters for the community.”) And this work accepts the pragmatism in Daniel Farber’s
admonition that “without having any overall vision of the field, it is unclear how either
agencies or courts can produce a halfway coherent approach to environmental law.” Daniel
A. Farber, Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 387 (2005).
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substantial weight in the balancing of competing considerations.”64 But unlike
Lazarus, who urges that a sophisticated understanding of environmental law comes
from appreciating the complexity of the problems that environmental laws try to
solve, this Article urges that understanding the sophistication of environmental law
lies in appreciating its simplicity. That is, the reason why environmental values
should be given weight is not because the laws and problems are complex but
because the fundamental aims of the statutes, when viewed in the aggregate, are
eerily direct.
To that end, Part I.A starts by surveying the breadth and depth of environmental
law’s vast legal infrastructure as evidence of Congressional commitment to
comprehensive regulation. Part I.B probes deeper by examining how Congressional
commitment is further evidenced not just by structure but by text, namely enacted
purpose statements and patterns of specific regulatory choices that prioritize public
health and long-term sustainability. Finally, Part I.C considers the historical context
of the modern statutory era, concluding that the commands found in federal
environmental statutes are part of a longer arc of evolving commitment to resource
protection in the settlement of the United States.
A. Intentionality Through Breadth and Depth: The Regulatory Reach and
Supporting Legal Infrastructure of Environmental Law
Individually and together, environmental laws at the federal, state and local
level create a comprehensive system of regulation reaching a nearly complete range
of natural resources, from water to air to soil to waste to wildlife. That breadth is
matched by depth, as evidenced by the profound legal infrastructure created by
environmental laws. Together the depth and breadth of the legal landscape are
products not of a singular decade or in response to a singular event, but of a sustained
American commitment to protecting nature from unbridled and haphazard
consumption.65
1. Breadth of Environmental Law
Consider the breadth and reach of federal statutes alone. The Clean Water Act,
an iconic cornerstone of U.S. environmental law, prohibits any discharge of any
pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit.66 Pollutant is defined
broadly to cover toxins as well as dirt.67 The jurisdictional scope over waters of the
United States is likewise broad.68 It reaches beyond major rivers like the Mississippi
or Missouri, offering protection to non-navigable tributaries, wetlands, and some
64

Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra note 16, at 706.
See infra Part I.C.
66
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
67
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
68
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United
States”); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(“Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly.”).
65
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intermittent streams.69 While the scope of the Clean Water Act has certainly attracted
controversy, the jurisdictional reach is an inevitable consequence of the physical
reality: Water is an interconnected resource; to protect water quality, therefore, one
has to fully commit or else not bother.70 Indeed, Congress was committed to
providing regulatory jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Constitution.71 Not
surprisingly, the Clean Water Act is so comprehensive that the U.S. Supreme Court
has declared that it occupies the field of water pollution control and preempts federal
common law.72
The Clean Air Act is similarly bold, taking on the complicated and important
task of ensuring Americans have clean air to breathe. Indeed, the immensity of the
undertaking is matched only by the enormity of the legal infrastructure created to
69
40 C.F.R. § 120.2; see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp.
685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers erred in reading the
Clean Water Act so narrowly as to include only traditionally navigable-in-fact waterways);
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329–30 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding
that Congress intended to control discharge of pollutants into non-navigable tributaries
which flowed into navigable waters, and that this exercise of authority was constitutional);
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that Congress
intended to address “the pollution of non-navigable mosquito canals and mangrove wetland
areas”).
70
See Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474–76 (2020)
(recognizing that all water is connected and holding that the Clean Water Act prohibits even
“functional equivalent of a direct discharge” of pollutants into waters of the United States
through groundwater in order to avoid creating “a serious loophole” in the Act’s permitting
scheme).
71
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 685 (D.D.C. 1975);
see also Jerry Jackson & Sarah V. Armitage, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes: A
Questionable Interpretation of § 404, 14 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10366, 10368
(1984) (“The courts have universally ruled that this meant the geographic scope of the Clean
Water Act was as broad as Congress’ practically unlimited power under the Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court has approvingly taken note of this judicial approach.”). But cf.
Solid Wate Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (invoking the constitutional avoidance canon to avoid the federalism concerns that
would arise if the Clean Water Act’s jurisdictional reach extended to the limits of the
Commerce Clause to reach wholly isolated intrastate wetlands).
72
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317–19 (1981)
(“Congress’ intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an all-encompassing
program of water pollution regulation.”). Note, however, that the Clean Water Act and Clean
Air Act both contain saving clause provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1370; 42 U.S.C. § 7416. For that
reason, the Supreme Court held in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette that the Clean Water
Act’s savings clause allow certain state common law claims to exist alongside federal
regulations. 479 U.S. 481, 497–99 (1987). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
the Clean Air Act’s substantially similar saving clause would permit state common law
claims to survive. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011)
(“In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law, the availability
. . . of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.” (citing
Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 489, 491, 497)).
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achieve it. To that end, the Clean Air Act utilizes a variety of tactics ranging from
permits to planning, from health-based to technology-forcing standards, from
mobile source to stationary source regulations, from end-of-pipe controls to ambient
air quality standards, from federal requirements to state-lead efforts.73 From toxics
to particulates, the Clean Air Act’s definition of “pollutant” is virtually allencompassing.74 Like the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act occupies its field and
preempts federal common law.75 That the breadth of the Clean Air Act gives it
flexibility to address emerging issues is a keystone of its durability, as the Supreme
Court recognized when it concluded the Act was aggressive enough in scope to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions.76
In other areas too, Congress took decisive action to tackle systemic issues. The
ESA, another American icon, is formidable in its “regulatory firepower”77 when it
comes to protecting species from extinction. It extends to private and public lands,
protects both listed species and their habitat, prohibits a broad range of activities
from outright killing to harassment, and creates categories of listed species to
broaden protections to threatened and not just endangered species.78 It is no wonder
that historian Roderick Nash dubbed the ESA “the strongest American legal
expression to date of environmental ethics.”79
73

For an in-depth look at the largess of the Clean Air Act’s many regulatory programs
and why the Act has been so durable over many political eras in the U.S., see LESSONS FROM
THE CLEAN AIR ACT: BUILDING DURABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY INTO US CLIMATE AND
ENERGY POLICY (Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019).
74
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007) (explaining that the
“sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’” under the Act “embraces all airborne compounds of
whatever stripe”).
75
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
76
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532 (“While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1)
might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and
scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language
of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such
obsolescence.”).
77
J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant, 19 DUKE ENV’T. L. &
POL’Y F. 275, 281 (2008).
78
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (1995) (“The
strength of the ESA lies with its stringent mandates constraining the actions of private parties
and public agencies. Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, it becomes entitled
to shelter under the act’s protective umbrella, a far-reaching array of provisions.”). For a
useful summary of the ESA’s regulatory programs, and a more detailed discussion of the
scope and limits of the Act’s regulatory power, see Ruhl, supra note 77, at 280–82. For a
discussion of ESA’s application to private lands, see ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL31796, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND CLAIMS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
“TAKINGS” (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31796.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B352LQ7].
79
RODERICK F. NASH, RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
175 (1989).
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Chemicals legislation too is notably broad in its scope. TSCA, first adopted in
197680 and amended in 2016,81 regulates all chemicals manufactured or sold in the
United States, except pesticides (which are regulated by the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).82 TSCA charges the EPA with gathering and
organizing information about the over 84,000 chemicals sold in the U.S.
marketplace; it allows the EPA to require testing of new and existing chemicals
where data regarding toxicity was deficient; and it authorizes a ban on chemicals
that pose an unreasonable risk of injury to human health or the environment.83 True,
TSCA turned out to be ineffective,84 but its origins reflect an aggressive attempt to
protect human health.85
Just as the ESA covers imperiled species and TSCA covers chemicals, RCRA86
covers waste disposal. Congress considered RCRA one of the “last remaining
loopholes in environmental law” and plugged that gap with a notoriously complex
cradle-to-grave regulatory structure.87 If RCRA nonetheless fails to prevent
environmental contamination through its front-end regulation, CERCLA serves as a
backstop to impose strict liability in a dramatic strict, joint and several fashion.88
80
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629).
81
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114-182,
130 Stat. 448 (2016).
82
7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y.
83
For a detailed discussion of TSCA regulatory scope, see Markell, supra note 33, at
340–50. For a discussion of how TSCA fits in with other chemicals legislation, see Knudsen,
supra note 33, at 2375–85.
84
For a taste of scholarship critiquing old TSCA, see Knudsen, supra note 33, at 2315
n.6. Roughly, old TSCA’s problems can be distilled into problems of (1) too little
gatekeeping before new chemicals were allowed to enter the marketplace by placing the
burden on EPA to show chemicals were unsafe rather than placing the burden on
manufacturers to show safety; (2) too many hurdles for EPA to show chemicals posed
“unreasonable risk of injury”; and (3) not enough support for EPA to adopt chemical bans or
use restrictions over less burdensome information disclosure even when EPA did conclude
chemicals posed “unreasonable risk of injury.” Id. at 2367–75.
85
See id. at 2368 (“The conferees intend that the Administrator have authority to protect
health and the environment.”).
86
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6908a.
87
For a useful introduction to RCRA’s history and complexity, see Susan M.
McMichael, RCRA’s Statutory and Regulatory Framework, 40 ENV’T L. REP. 10432 (2010).
88
See Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law of Liable Party CERCLA
Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 209 (2018) (“CERCLA’s dramatic scope lies in its creation
of a broad set of PRPs, multiple pathways for remediation, and expansive liability rules.”)
(citing LAZARUS, MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 21, at 108–09). For a view
of how EPA took aggressive positions on its authority under CERLCA in the early years of
implementation, see Phillip D. Reed, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of
Generator Liability, 14 ENV’T L. REP. 10224, 10224 (1984) (“EPA has interpreted CERCLA
to sidestep certain common law causation and culpability requirements, putting the burden
of cleaning up old chemical dumps on hazardous substance generators and other responsible
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And then there is NEPA.89 No single act comes closer to offering an
exoskeleton to federal decision-making than NEPA. This umbrella statute requires
all federal agencies, from the Department of Transportation to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to study the
environmental impacts of their proposed actions before finalizing decisions.90
NEPA’s application to all federal agencies and all major federal actions shows
Congress intended to raise environmental consciousness in all aspects of
government decision-making.91 Senator Henry Jackson, the statute’s author, did not
equivocate when explaining the significance of NEPA:
A statement of environmental policy is more than a statement of what we
believe as a people and as a Nation. It establishes priorities and gives
expression to our national goals and aspirations. It provides a statutory
foundation to which administrators may refer for guidance in making
decisions which find environmental values in conflict with other values.92
While the substantive commands of NEPA have been excised from the
legislation by courts,93 the procedural commands have become a bedrock of federal
agency decision-making. Through procedure, NEPA shines a light on the
environmental impacts of agency actions and ensures that agency decisions will at
least be informed, if not wise.94
private parties first, essentially relegating the Superfund to cases where no ‘financially
viable’ private parties can be found.”).
89
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370m-12. “President Nixon signed [NEPA] into law on January
1, 1970. Welcome, NEPA, https://ceq.doe.gov/ [https://perma.cc/7U7F-497C] (last visited
July 29, 2022).
90
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (directing all federal agencies to prepare environmental impact
statements for their proposed actions); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(k) (2022) (defining “[f]ederal
agency” as “all agencies of the Federal Government”).
91
See Dinah Bear, NEPA: Substance or Merely Process?, 8 F. APPLIED RSCH. & PUB.
POL’Y 85, 86 (1993) (“NEPA’s environmental impact assessment process was intended to
be, and should be viewed as, an important means to achieve the goal of integrating
environmental values into decision making in a wise and balanced manner.”). For a
discussion of the substantive dimensions of NEPA, see Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise
– Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENV’T L. 533 (1990). For a discussion of NEPA’s success in
injecting an environmental consciousness into decision-making even in its weakened
procedural form, see ENV’T L. INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT (2010), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/elipubs/d20-03.pdf [perma.cc/6ZVK-GHN2].
92
Yost, supra note 91, at 533 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40, 416 (1969)).
93
RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 12, at § 7:45 (“That National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) could be distorted into a legal ‘something’ that is entirely indifferent to
the physical environment would have astounded its creators.”).
94
Russell E. Train, Foreword to ENV’T L. INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES:
CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 3 (2010) (“NEPA
democratized decision-making.”).
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These statutes cover water, air, chemicals, waste disposal, site contamination,
even generic governmental decision-making—and these are just some of the laws.
Not yet mentioned are many of the natural resource statutes including the Wilderness
Act,95 the National Forest Management Act,96 the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA),97 and the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916.98
And then there are a host of less-discussed statutes liked the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act,99 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,100 the
Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act,101 and the Marine Mammal Protection
Act.102 In sum, U.S. environmental laws cover numerous facets of human interaction
with the environment.
To further complete the picture of cultural commitment to environmental
protection, one would surely need to consider the multitude of state laws—some of
which exist at the constitutional level103 and many of which tackle the uncomfortable
issues of land use directly.104 Indeed, nearly every facet of human interaction with
95

16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1687.
97
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787.
98
Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535. The original Act, previously located at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1–4, was recodified in 2014 alongside other provisions related to the national park system
and management at 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101–104909. See Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128 Stat 3094
(2014). Many of these provisions focus on natural resource and environmental management.
E.g., 54 U.S.C. §§ 100701–100755.
99
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b.
100
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050.
101
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328.
102
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h.
103
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST., art. VIII § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for the
utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State,
including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.”).
104
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-19-4 (requiring land use restrictions for areas prone to
flooding); CONN. GEN. STAT. 16a-27(c), (d) (requiring a state plan of conservation and
development that takes into account risks associated with natural hazards like flooding,
coastal erosion, high winds and wildfires); KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 21A.16.010–.370,
https://kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/kc_code/24_30_Title_21A.aspx (setting forth
development standards for landscaping and water use for King County, Washington);
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 23-22-058, https://library.municode.com/wa/seattle/codes/
municipal_code?nodeId=TIT23LAUSCO_SUBTITLE_IIPLRE_CH23.22SU_SUBCHAPT
ER_IIPRPLCO_23.22.058ENCRAR [https://perma.cc/PX24-WTAR] (“No plat shall be
approved by the Hearing Examiner covering any land situated in a riparian corridor, wetland
and wetland buffer, or steep slope and steep slope buffer unless in compliance with the
applicable provisions of Section 25.09.240.”); see also Development Regulations and
Zoning, MUN. RSCH. SERVS. CTR., https://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/Develo
pment-Regulations/Development-Regulations-and-Zoning.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S8A7QZ9Q] (last updated Aug. 25, 2022) (providing “an overview of development regulations
and zoning codes in Washington State”). For a historic perspective on state and municipal
land use codes, see Ernest J.T. Loo, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45
96
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nature is regulated at either the federal, state, or local level: from hazardous waste
disposal to recycling and garbage collection; from power plants to in-stream flows;
and from water use to pesticide application. In the aggregate, the multi-layered,
multi-faceted web of legal protections at every level of government reveal a
noteworthy intentionality.
Of course, individual pieces of legislation may appear, and have been variously
described, as ad hoc reactions to disastrous events. The Clean Water Act of 1972
found political will when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire for the third time, or so
the story goes.105 The Clean Air Act of 1970 was enacted only after the skies of Steel
City were blackened by unregulated production.106 The soot-encrusted stone on
bridges over the Ohio River bear the marks of history to this day. The Oil Pollution
Control Act was born of the ecological wreckage and public outcry from the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill in Alaska’s previously pristine Prince William Sound.107 Reaching
further back in history, the regulation of grazing on federal lands traces its roots to
the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, a statute enacted at the same time that the Dust
Bowl deposited Midwestern dirt on the steps of Congress in Washington, D.C.108
The ESA, not surprisingly, was a response to historically accelerated extinction
rates.109
FORDHAM L. REV. 1154 (1977) (“[T]he recognition that land is a valuable and limited
resource, the concern for environmental protection, and the realization that land development
often has effects which extend beyond the immediate environs of the development site have
prompted national and state efforts to provide for state control over land use.”).
105
See Johnathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENV’T. L.J. 89 (2002) (telling the tale of the
Cuyahoga river and the effects it had on environmental law); see also Ariel Wittenberg, Did
a Burning River Really Fuel Landmark Law’s Passage?, E&E NEWS (June 18, 2019, 1:05
PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060582811 [https://perma.cc/Q6W6-SBMD].
106
Clean Air Act Requirements and History, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-actoverview/clean-air-act-requirements-and-history [https://perma.cc/QY27-NU2U] (last
visited July 19, 2022) (“Dense, visible smog in many of the nation’s cities and industrial
centers helped to prompt passage of the 1970 legislation at the height of the national
environmental movement.”).
107
All Things Considered, A Look at the 1990 Oil Pollution Act, NPR (June 15, 2010,
3:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2010/06/15/127862906/a-look-at-the-1990-oil-pollution-act
[https://perma.cc/722G-HVA6]; see also JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RSCH. SERV.
RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS (2010).
108
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 733 (2000) (“The devastating storms
of the Dust Bowl were in the words of one Senator ‘the most tragic, the most impressive
lobbyist, that ha[s] ever come to this Capitol.’”). For a history and critique of the conditions
that led to the Dust Bowl, see DONALD WORSTER, THE DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS
IN THE 1930S (1979).
109
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(a)(1)–(2) (noting concern for species that have gone extinct
and are in danger of becoming extinct as a result of “economic growth and development
untempered by adequate concern and conservation”); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (“The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt
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The dominant stories about the reactive posture of environmental legislation
gives the impression, even among scholars, that environmental law is ad hoc.110 For
example, Todd Aagaard has argued that use conflicts are the defining feature of
environmental laws and, as such, it is not possible to attribute broader cohesion to
the body of law as embodying a unifying ethical impulse.111 More specifically,
Aagaard argues that statutory lawmaking, unlike judicial lawmaking, “lacks a
similar coherence-favoring force.” 112 He explains that “[l]egislatures enact and
amend different statutes in different lawmaking moments, each associated with its
own particular context and its own set of compromises.”113 Richard Lazarus, in his
examination of the Supreme Court’s environmental decisions from the 1970s
through 1990s, suggests that the ad hoc perception of environmental law is at play
in the courts as well: “[T]he opinions and votes of the Justices suggest the relative
absence of any notion that environmental law is a distinct area of law, as opposed to
just a collection of legal issues incidentally arising in a factual setting in which
environmental protection concerns are what is at stake.”114
Given the individual stories of how federal environmental statutes were born
of momentary awakenings, it is not very surprising that courts, scholars and others
with an interest in the subject might see environmental law as a reactionary field.
After all, disaster does repeatedly appear to serve as political inspiration. Still, if one
looks beyond individual statutes and moments in time, one might start to formulate
a different picture. That picture is one of intentionality—the development of an
exoskeleton that is the product of aggregate legislative responses and repeated
commitments in space and time.
This is especially so if one delves a little more deeply into the idea that the
fervor of legislative action repeats not only over a broad range of issues but also over
a remarkable period of time. Many of the comprehensive and landmark
environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s were the culmination of a longer,
iterative process of refining the laws needed to provide the protections desired.115
The Clean Water Act of 1972 has roots in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and
was preceded more immediately by the Water Quality Act of 1965 and the Water

and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”); see also Shannon
Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered
Species Act, 29 ENV’T. L. 463, 464 (1999) (discussing the ESA’s legislative history and
whether the ESA was meant to protect less charismatic species).
110
Cf. Driesen, supra note 56, at 59–60 (observing that regulatory reformers do not
often see a positive vision of environmental law, but “see a mass of complex statutory
provisions exhibiting little rhyme or reason”).
111
Aagaard, supra note 56, at 252.
112
Id. at 232.
113
Id.
114
Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra note 16, at 737.
115
See, e.g., RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 12, at § 13:1; see also infra Part II.B.
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Quality Improvement Act of 1970.116 In fact, it was originally enacted in 1948 and
amended several times before 1972.117 With each amendment, Congress
strengthened controls to reflect a deepening commitment of constituents “ready to
follow more and stricter rules.”118
The Clean Air Act of 1970 had similarly deep roots and a historical trajectory
likewise bending towards more, not less, restraint.119 The 1955 Air Pollution Control
Act marked one of the first efforts to benchmark the relationship between emissions
and human health through science.120 Federally funded research spurred more air
quality lawmaking at the federal level—first with the 1963 Clean Air Act, then the
1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, and then again in 1990 with additional
amendments.121 Like water pollution control efforts, the air pollution control laws
have become stronger over time, responding to science and iteratively recommitting
to the goal of healthy air.122
In natural resources and public lands management, a trend towards stewardship
and self-restraint is also prevalent. The ESA of 1973 was the bold refinement and
extension of statutes like the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 and the
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969;123 and long before that, Congress
took its “first significant direct step toward national wildlife regulation” by passing
the Lacey Act of 1900.124 BLM land management saw a similar upgrade in resource
management.125 The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,126 which largely presumed cattle
grazing to be the dominant use on federal rangelands, gave way to the Multiple Use
116

For a timeline and compendium of water pollution control efforts in the U.S. since
the 1800s, see RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 12, at § 14:1. For a “[narrative-history] of
federal involvement in water pollution control,” see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of
Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972:
Part II, 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 215, 216 (2003). For a history of developments at the state and
local level, see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 145
(2003).
117
See RODGERS & BURLESON, supra note 12.
118
BROOKS, supra note 43, at 125.
119
Id. at 133–39; see also Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New
Interpretation, 45 ENV’T L. 75, 76–77 (2015) (offering a counter-narrative to “[t]he
traditional view of historians of environmental law . . . that the Clean Air Act (CAA) was
passed in 1970 in response to the Year of the Environment”).
120
See Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
121
See BROOKS, supra note 43, at 136; see also Ahlers, supra note 119, at 124.
122
See BROOKS, supra note 43, at 134.
123
Endangered Species Act Milestones: Pre 1973, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://fws.gov/node/266462 [https://perma.cc/ZB6G-E8XJ] (last visited July 29, 2022).
124
Petersen, supra note 109, at 469.
125
For an insightful discussion of changing attitudes and law in public lands
management, see Robert Keiter, Change Comes to the Public Lands: New Forces,
Directions, and Policies, 46 FOUND. J. NAT. RES. ENERGY L. 3 (2000) [hereinafter Keiter,
Change Comes to the Public Lands].
126
Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–315r).
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Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY),127 which required the management of public
lands for multiple uses ranging from grazing to recreation “in the combination that
will best meet the needs of the American people.”128 No single use was given priority
over another, reflecting a significant change in values that had come before.129
MUSY later gave way to the modern FLPMA of 1976,130 which provided muchneeded cohesion to the BLM’s inventorying and resource planning of predominantly
Western rangelands.131
Though the 1970s are known for being the “environmental decade,”132
Congress continued to refine and renew commitments to environmental protections
in the decades since (albeit at a much slower pace).133 The Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1987, for example, set firmer deadlines and provided more nuance
in order to accelerate the EPA’s progress on regulating storm water discharge.134
Similarly, to rectify some of the shortcomings of the Federal Insecticide Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Congress enacted the Food Quality Protection Act
(FQPA) of 1996.135 The FQPA dialed up protections from pesticide residue on food
by prohibiting the reregistration of food-use pesticides without a safe residue
tolerance.136 The setting of safety tolerances specifically called for assessing
aggregate exposure and considering the particular vulnerabilities of cumulative
chemical exposure in children.137 Also in the area of chemicals legislation, Congress
more recently enacted amendments to TSCA to shift the burden to manufacturers of
127

Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as amended at 16 USC §§ 528–531).
16 U.S.C. § 531(a).
129
ANTHONY GODFREY, THE EVER-CHANGING VIEW: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
FORESTS IN CALIFORNIA 399 (2005) (explaining that “timber, range, water, recreation and
wildlife . . . [f]or the first time . . . were contained in one law, with no single use having
priority over another”).
130
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787).
131
See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 733–39 (2000); see also Roger
Flynn, Daybreak on the Land: The Coming of Age of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 29 VT. L. REV. 815, 816–21 (2005).
132
See LAZARUS, MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 21, at 67 (“The 1970s
were an extraordinary decade for environmental law.”).
133
See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 629 (2006) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Congressional Descent] (“Since 1990, however, congressional passage of new significant
environmental authorization legislation has virtually ground to a halt.”).
134
Lawrence R. Liebesman & Elliott P. Laws, The Water Quality Act of 1987: A Major
Step in Assuring the Quality of the Nation’s Waters, 17 ENV’T L. REP. 10311, 10323–25
(1987) (expounding on the history of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act).
135
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405, 110 Stat. 1489
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346(a)). For a brief history of FIFRA and the FQPA,
see Knudsen, supra note 33, at 2375–79.
136
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Regan, 996 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir.
2021).
137
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i); see also Knudsen, supra note 33, at 2379 nn.298–301
& accompanying text.
128
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showing that new chemicals are safe before they are sold in U.S. markets.138 Even
in the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,139 which laid bare the teeth of the
ESA and was expected to trigger legislative rollbacks, Congress left the most
consequential protections for endangered species in place.140
Time and again, where the commands of the original legislation fell short,
Congress returned with greater vigor in legislative amendments. In the end, what has
emerged is an impressive pattern of responding to the degradation and depletion of
resources with systemic legal frameworks. Not only that, but the breadth and
repetition of legislative action suggest that environmental laws are more than a
political checklist seeking only to satisfy a temporary news cycle of concern. It
suggests that the values are durable and intentionally so.141
When examining the longevity of Congress’s commitment to the enterprise of
environmental protection, there is a notable caveat: Congress’s appetite for
meaningful reform of environmental laws has dropped off in recent decades.
Professor Richard Lazarus in his article, Congressional Descent, observed that
“between 1970 and the early part of the twenty-first century, Congress’s ability to
serve a constructive role in the ongoing process of environmental lawmaking has
virtually disappeared.”142 Professor Sandra Zellmer has also taken stock of
congressional inaction and used the Clean Air Act of 1990 as the stopping point for
“any meaningful action.”143 While these assessments come before the bipartisan
support for TSCA reform that brought meaningful change to chemicals regulation
in 2016, the lack of Congressional action on climate change is surely an indictment
of political prioritization of environmental health and human survival.
Still, disappointing as it may be that Congress has not continued to revisit and
refine its approach to environmental protection with the fervor of the 1970s and
1980s, strong laws remain on the books. In fact, Professor Rodgers has remarked
that some of the laws are so steadfastly accepted as part of the regulatory fabric that
they functionally have a pseudo-constitutional status.144 At the end of the day, for all
the talk about backlash on environmental regulation, the comprehensive legislative
138

Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 114182, 130 Stat. 448 (2016).
139
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
140
For a detailed narrative of the political machinations surrounding the TVA v. Hill
litigation, see ELIZABETH GARRETT, The Story of TVA v. Hill: Congress Has the Last Word,
in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 79, 85–86 (William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip P.
Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, eds., 1st ed. 2011) (noting that Congress crafted a “targeted
response” to TVA v. Hill, as a legislative compromise that preserved the ESA’s general
protections, but allowed for a committee to exempt certain projects).
141
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
142
Lazarus, Congressional Descent, supra note 133, at 621–22; see also RODGERS &
BURLESON, supra note 12, at § 7:31 (“The Lazarus article on Congressional Descent is a
must-read on the status of U.S. environmental laws in today’s world.”).
143
Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2324 (2013).
144
See Rodgers, supra note 26, at 1013 (asserting that certain environmental laws “have
become virtually repeal-proof” and reached a “kind of functional constitutional law”).
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commands that create an exoskeleton of protection stay with us. And Congress
continues to appropriate funds to carry out the missions of its legislative
commands.145
As long as they remain, these laws deserve respect under the principle of
institutional settlement. That principle, which some prominent legal process
theorists have called central to the idea of law, calls for the whole of society to accept
as binding “decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established
procedures . . . .”146 In the legislative process, the constitutional guarantees of
bicameralism and presentment legitimize the ultimate decisions and demand respect.
Put another way, the legislative process is often a contentious one, fraught with
skepticism, and riddled with self-dealing. Thus, when the process concludes with a
piece of complex legislation that undeniably advances values of self-restraint, those
values cannot be sidestepped by apathy. The respect counseled by the principle of
institutional settlement is even more critical when the legislative process repeatedly
chooses self-restraint across a comprehensive range of resources.
2. Depth of Environmental Law
It is not just the breadth and staying power of environmental law that is
impressive. The breadth is also supported by depth. The legal infrastructure that
these laws create is vast, layered, and enduring. It is consistent with a Congress
committed to actually addressing complex resource use dilemmas and setting
priorities. It is consistent with the construction of an exoskeleton that is intended to
protect public health and welfare.147
Take, for example, the Clean Water Act. It utilizes a scaffolding of pollution
control techniques, from permitting of individual point sources to setting of ambient
water quality standards, from state certification of federally issued permits to EPA
oversight on wetlands permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, from
technology forcing limits to assessments of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs).148
145
CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER ACT:
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 1 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30030.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3LBE-FWLL].
146
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107
HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2045 (1994) (quoting 1 HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT K. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4–5 (tent.
ed. 1958)).
147
The vast infrastructure has also been subject of critique by those who see it as an
ineffective bureaucracy. E.g., Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 153, 154 (1988) (stating “the system has grown
to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central
planning of the economy to achieve environmental goals”).
148
For a general discussion the intentional reach of the Clean Water Act with an
emphasis on point sources, see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981) (stating “Congress’ intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an all-
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The totality of the programs and regulatory devices reflects a legislative
commitment to actually achieving the stated goals of maintaining and achieving the
“chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”149 Indeed,
implementing the various commands of the Clean Water Act requires fiscal
commitment. According to a 2016 report by the Congressional Research Service,
“more than 65,000 conventional industrial and municipal dischargers must obtain
permits from the EPA (or qualified states) under the act’s National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program (authorized in Section 402 of the
act).”150 Such permits are similarly “required for more than 150,000 industrial and
municipal sources of stormwater discharges.” 151 Separate permits are required under
Section 404 of the Act for wetlands disturbance or dredge and fill.152
Undoubtedly, the infrastructure of the Clean Water Act reflects more than a
half-hearted response to water pollution, and this pattern is repeated. Consider
RCRA and its cradle to grave approach to waste regulation.153 Consider too the
Clean Air Act and its many title programs that target stationary source154 as well as
mobile source emissions,155 criteria pollutants156 as well as hazardous air
pollutants,157 federal setting of new source performance standards,158 and mandatory
state implementation plans.159 Similarly, in the area of forest or rangeland
encompassing program of water pollution regulation”). For a discussion of the Clean Water
Act’s use of water quality standards and TMDLS to reach beyond point source problems, see
Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake
Bay, 41 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10208, 10208 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he CWA,
with multiple paths to its destination, is reinventing itself once more”). For a discussion on
limits of the Act with respect to groundwater, see Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water
Act Cooperatively Federal—Or, Why the Clean Water Act Does Not Directly Regulate
Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 448 (2018); but cf.
Cnty. of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020) (concluding that the
reach of the Act “is significantly broader than the total exclusion of all discharges through
groundwater”). For a discussion of 401 certification and its power to address nonpoint source
pollution, see Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 206 (1996).
149
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
150
COPELAND, supra note 145, at 5.
151
Id.
152
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
153
See McMichael, supra note 87; see also CAROLINE N. BROUN & JAMES T. O’REILLY,
1 RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A PRACTICE GUIDE § 2:4, Westlaw RCRASFPGF (3d ed., 2022
update).
154
While the stationary source requirements are located in several parts of the Clean
Air Act, those related to the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program are found
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7479.
155
42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7554, 7581–7590.
156
42 U.S.C. § 7408.
157
42 U.S.C. § 7412.
158
42 U.S.C. § 7411.
159
42 U.S.C. § 7410.
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management, there are layers of required planning and impacts analysis to ensure
federal public lands are not degraded from inadvertent overuse.160
Permitting,161 technology standards,162 planning,163 volumes of associated
regulations,164 and penalties for violations165 all add up to a body of commands
designed to throw a significant weight of the law behind environmental protection.
In sum, the breadth and depth of environmental laws evidence the intentional
donning of an exoskeleton meant to serve as a counterweight to other shorter-term
impulses often accompanied by unbridled consumption.
Of course, there are those who use the breadth of environmental law to fuel a
deregulatory agenda, attacking the EPA’s efforts to protect public health as
government overreach and undue interference with individual freedoms.166 Hidden
in the rhetoric is a kernel of truth—American environmentalism exists in tension
with what social scientists have identified as the dominant paradigm of beliefs that
reflect “faith in material abundance and support for private property rights, a laissezfaire economy, and limited governmental regulation.”167 Laws that further
environmental values are, therefore, prone to attack by disposition.
What makes environmental laws prone to attack also underscores the need for
respect. To that end, one can imagine the substantial inertia that is required for
Congress to enact laws that run counter to the dominant paradigm. That means these
laws were successfully adopted and have persevered for decades despite well-heeled

160

See generally Keiter, Change Comes to the Public Lands, supra note 125 (discussing
regional planning and ecosystem management).
161
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (setting forth the Clean Water Act’s National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permitting requirements).
162
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1317(a)(2) (setting forth the Clean Water Act provisions for
technology based standards for controlling discharge of toxic pollutants require that toxic
pollutants “shall be subject to effluent limitations resulting from the application of the best
available technology economically achievable” for the applicable category of points
sources).
163
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1313(d) (setting forth the Clean Water Act provisions requiring
states to prepare total maximum daily load (TMDL) for water bodies not meeting their water
quality standards function as planning tools); see also Clean Water Act Section 303(d):
Impaired Waters and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
tmdl [https://perma.cc/2QXP-8AHX] (describing TMDL as “the starting point or planning
tool for restoring water quality”).
164
For just a snapshot of the environmental regulations enacted by EPA and pertaining
mainly to pollution control laws (not even counting the natural resource management
regulations), see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1900.2.
165
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (authorizing penalties for up to $25,000 per Clean Water
Act violation per day).
166
See EPA Regulatory Overreach: Impacts on American Competitiveness: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 114th Cong. 114–21 (2015),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg95226/html/CHRG-114hhrg95226
.htm [https://perma.cc/Y25Y-ZN2M].
167
CANNON, supra note 14, at 7.
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litigation and intense industry lobbying intent on their demise.168 In fact, the laws
have not only endured, but they have been amended chiefly to strengthen their
weaknesses.169 It is precisely because environmental laws counter the dominant
paradigm that we might rightfully observe that what exists is not a fluke; we did not
come by environmental law’s exoskeleton lightly. It exists only because of
intentionality.
B. Textual Evidence of Intentionality: Enacted Purpose Statements and
Supporting Regulatory Choices
Even if one agrees that the broad patterns in the breadth, depth, and staying
power of environmental law’s codification portend a sort of ethic expressed in an
exoskeleton, the more difficult question is the degree to which Congress meant to
prioritize conservation values (that is, the values of self-restraint) above competing
values like short-term economic growth. To answer that question, one has to look
more closely at the text of the statutes. Like the regulatory reach and substantial legal
infrastructure, the text compels an understanding of environmental law as part of a
deliberate cultural shift towards self-restraint. The relevant text lies both in the
enacted purpose statements and in the detailed regulatory choices selected to
accomplish those purposes.
1. Enacted Purpose Statements
The textual exploration of environmental laws should include the enacted
purpose statements—that is, the legislative statements of policy encoded in the laws
themselves.170 Indeed, because of the complexity of many environmental statutes
and the problems they are meant to address, it is easy to lose sight of their driving
goals upon implementation. But losing sight of the ultimate goal weakens the
prospect of achieving it. Conversely, testing outcomes and interpretations against
the fundamental aims can give shape to discretion and clarify complexity. Indeed,
Professor Bill Rodgers, author of the leading treatise on environmental law, has

168
See, e.g., Kyle C. Meng & Ashwin Rode, The Social Cost of Lobbying over Climate
Policy, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 472–76 (2019) (“This paper examines how lobbying
spending on the Waxman–Markey bill, the most prominent and promising United States
climate regulation so far, altered its likelihood of being implemented.”).
169
But cf. Lazarus, Congressional Descent, supra note 133, at 632 (“With the stalling
of Congress’s normal avenues for environmental lawmaking, a second type of legislation has
quietly established its dominance over environmental law: appropriations legislation.”).
170
Other scholars have written articles advancing the claim that purpose statements
deserve a more prominent place in statutory interpretation. See Kevin M. Stack, The Enacted
Purposes Canon, 105 IOWA L. REV. 283 (2019) [hereinafter Stack, Enacted Purposes
Canon]; Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669,
671–75 (2019).
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keenly observed that “[t]he ‘complexities’ of the Clean Air Act are put in better
focus when one appreciates its driving purpose—to protect public health.”171
Part III.B will take up the task of explaining why, individually, enacted purpose
statements of environmental laws should be given weight in judicial review. For
now, it is sufficient to provide some examples on how, when examined in the
aggregate, the purpose statements of major and even lesser-known environmental
laws are consistent with the notion of environmental law as an exoskeleton.
If, for the moment, we accept enacted purpose statements as direct windows to
legislative intent, it is hard not to appreciate the stewardship ethic (or ethic of selfrestraint) that lies at the heart of environmental laws, individually and collectively.
For the most straightforward illustration, consider the Congressional declaration of
purpose for NEPA: “The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man.”172 The Act
then sets forth an unequivocal set of national environmental policies, declaring
among other things that the federal government has a continuing responsibility to
serve as “trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;” to ensure
Americans have “safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings;” and to assure that the environment is used in a manner “without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences.”173 Congress even states that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation of the environment.174 Bear in mind that NEPA is a
directive towards all federal agencies.175 Through NEPA, Congress made clear that
whatever else might drive policy in the U.S., stewardship of the environment is a
priority.
If NEPA stood alone, one might question its usefulness in evidencing a broad
cultural commitment to environmental responsibility. But NEPA does not stand
alone. NEPA stands among numerous other statutes in which Congress repeatedly
declares a vision for America’s future where a healthy environment is a cornerstone
of prosperity. In the Clean Water Act, Congress’s aim was nothing short of
“restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s water.”176 To achieve that goal, Congress called for the elimination of
pollutant discharges by 1985 and the prohibition on discharges of toxins in toxic

171

RODGERS, JR. & BURLESON, supra note 12, at § 6:2; see also Robert W. Adler, The
Decline and (Possible) Renewal of Aspiration in the Clean Water Act, 88 WASH. L. REV.
759, 761 (2013) (“At times, however, this degree of complexity obscures the relatively
straightforward . . . objective” of the Clean Water Act.).
172
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
173
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3).
174
42 U.S.C. § 4331(c).
175
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (requiring “all agencies of the Federal Government” to comply
with NEPA’s objectives).
176
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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amounts.177 Whatever the details of the implementation, the ultimate goal does not
lack clarity. And in the Clean Air Act, Congress is clear about the government’s
responsibility in controlling the complex collective action problem that is air
pollution.178 The ESA, not surprisingly, is meant to “provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved.”179
Even lesser-known environmental laws like the Surface Mining Control Act
lead with the purpose of “establish[ing] a nationwide program to protect society and
the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.”180 To
be sure, that Act also recognizes the importance of coal to provide for energy
needs,181 but the clear statement of environmental protection sits at the helm. In the
Marine Mammal Protection Act Congress does not equivocate in its pronouncement
that “marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international
significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic,” and “that the primary
objective of their management should be to maintain the health and stability of the
marine ecosystem.”182
In the public lands realm, the Wilderness Act gets most of the attention for its
almost poetic devotion to protect wilderness, “an area where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain.”183 Less poetic, but still devoted, the work horse lands operated by the
Forest Service and BLM express a steadfast commitment to restraint. In NFMA,
Congress declares that “the Forest Service, by virtue of its statutory authority for
management of the National Forest System, . . . has both a responsibility and an
opportunity to be a leader in assuring that the Nation maintains a natural resource
conservation posture that will meet the requirements of our people in perpetuity.”184
NFMA’s close cousin FLPMA, which draws on the notoriously broad concept of
multiple use, directs the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to utilize resources
“in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American
people.”185 In doing so, Congress puts an unmistakable priority on land health over
economic gains, directing the BLM to engage in the “harmonious and coordinated
management of the various resources without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration being
177

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (3).
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (“[T]he growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution
brought about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare . . . .”); id. at
(a)(3)–(4) (“[A]ir pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and
local government” but that federal leadership is “essential”).
179
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
180
30 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
181
30 U.S.C. § 1202(f).
182
16 U.S.C. § 1361(6).
183
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
184
16 U.S.C. § 1600(6).
185
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
178
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given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination
of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.”186
More specifically, in the development of land use plans, the Secretary must “weigh
long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits.”187
Bear in mind that these are not statements uttered on the debate floor or
explanations found in committee reports. This is not legislative history. It is
legislative text providing a direct window to legislative intent. For that reason, the
boldness of these aspirations is indispensable to anyone trying to understand whether
environmental laws embody the intentionality urged here.
2. Regulatory Choices in Support of Purpose Statements
Purpose statements are not textual islands. They are backed by regulatory
choices.188 Those choices and the substantial infrastructure necessary to support
them demonstrate a commitment to environmental protection that is more than
political lip service.189
In particular, three patterns of regulatory choices are worth exploring. First, are
the cascading regulatory commands and multiple layers of oversight that
characterize many of the major federal statutes. Second, are the so-called
“showstoppers”—the legislative commands with clear prioritization of
environmental or public health protection over any single project or permit
application. Third, are the legislative designs driving a one-way, downward
ratcheting of pollution. These are the action-forcing provisions that harness science,
technology and human innovation in a way that raises the bar on degradation. Some
examples help illustrate the point.
(a) Examples of Cascading Regulatory Commands
The Clean Water Act is a good example of how major federal environmental
statutes use a variety of regulatory approaches to reinforce the core purpose of
protecting water quality. The Act begins with a prohibition on pollution: no
discharges from point sources into waters of the United States without a permit.190
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Id.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(7).
188
See Adler, supra note 171, at 771 (“Congress included in the CWA specific
operative provisions designed to implement the major aspirations in the statute’s opening
statement, making it more difficult to simply ignore those aspirations as the product of lofty
legislative pronouncements.”).
189
For an examination of the various categories of regulatory choices contained in
environmental legislation and a conception of the normative principles those choices are
meant to serve, see Driesen, supra note 56.
190
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
187
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There is, in other words, no entitlement to pollute.191 Permission, obtained through
an orderly system that considers both technological feasibility and impacts on the
receiving water, is required.192 The extensive permitting scheme is backed up by
State-adopted ambient water quality standards; effluent limits and other permit
conditions are developed to ensure the receiving water meet water quality
standards.193 If not, the permit can be denied.194 Within the permitting system for
point sources there are multiple regulatory tools at play—technology-forcing
standards;195 water-quality based standards;196 margins of safety;197 monitoring and
reporting requirements;198 hefty fines for violations;199 and citizen suits.200
The NPDES permitting system, intricate in its own right, is not the sum total
of the Clean Water Act’s regulatory approach. Sitting below the surface of the
elaborate point source permitting system is an equally complex system for protecting
water bodies that fail to meet water quality standards despite the permits. To that
end, when the permitting system fails to adequately protect water bodies from the
191

See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 3709 (1972) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Committee believes that
the no-discharge declaration in Section 13 of the 1899 Refuse Act is useful as an enforcement
tool. Therefore, [Section 301 of the Clean Water Act] declares the discharge of pollutants
unlawful. The Committee believes it is important to clarify this point: No one has the right
to pollute. But the Committee recognizes the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution
immediately. Therefore, this section provides an exception if the discharge meets the
requirements of this section, Section 402, and others listed in the bill.”); see also Carmen E.
Pavel, A Legal Conventionalist Approach to Pollution, L. & PHIL. 337, 338 (2016).
192
See DAVID HAIR & PRAVIN RANA, EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL 1-3 to
1-7 (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-09/documents/pwm_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MV7Y-LA6H] (discussing the elements of the NPDES program, and
pointing out that a NPDES permit “provides two types of control: technology-based
limitations . . . and water quality-based limitations”).
193
See id. at 3-3.
194
40 C.F.R. § 122.64(a)(3); e.g., Memorandum from Chris Montague-Breakwell,
Watershed Resources Unit Supervisor, Washington Water Quality Program, to Rich
Doenges, Section Manager, Washington Dept. of Ecology (Sept. 20, 2018) (providing an
example of permit denial on this basis in Washington) https://ecology.wa.gov/DOE/files/6c
/6c380b6d-1ef1-441e-8136-f4e8d7eebb48.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9FA-5KRQ].
195
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
196
33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(2).
197
Id.; see also Driesen, supra note 56, at 71 (discussing margin of safety requirements
alongside purpose statements to illustrate that “the choice of an effects-based goal embraces
a normative commitment to health and environmental protection. It gives that commitment
primacy over competing values”).
198
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j).
199
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), (g).
200
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B); see also David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental
Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement
Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV.
1552, 1561 (1995) (“[O]nly extensive use of citizen suits as private attorneys general can
safeguard the enforcement system from collapse and prevent states from using lax
environmental enforcement as an economic development tool.”).
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aggregate impacts of point and nonpoint sources, the Act introduces the idea of
TMDLs.201 A TMDL is the total amount of any given pollutant that can be added to
a water body and still meet water quality standards, with a margin of safety built
in.202 The TMDL is used to perform a holistic analysis of point and nonpoint source
inputs to the water body; States are expected to use the TMDL to allocate pollutant
loads among the various sources and regulate accordingly.203
The Clean Water Act also uses overlapping authorities to protect against
agency capture and provide safeguards for environmental health. For example,
through the Section 401 certification process, federal power is fortified with state
and tribal power to place conditions on federal permits that would degrade the water
quality below state standards.204 In 2017, the Washington Department of Ecology
used its 401 certification authority to deny a federal dredge and fill permit for what
would have been the largest coal export terminal in North America along the
Columbia River.205 Similarly, the EPA is given oversight authority on wetlands or
“dredge and fill” permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.206 In cases
where the project would cause an “unacceptable adverse environmental impact,” the
EPA can veto the permit and prevent the project from moving forward.207 These
overlapping authorities and regulatory checks reflect a prioritization of
environmental health even in a regulatory scheme that operates largely on
pragmatism and trade-offs.
The Clean Water Act is not unique in its multiple layers of regulatory
complexity. The Clean Air Act is similarly structured to achieve strong public health
goals through interlacing commands. It has legislative drivers that unequivocally
prioritize human health over economic consideration.208 To that end, the National
201

33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); see also OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL
PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION (1999); Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV: The
Final Frontier, 29 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10469 (1999).
202
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); see also 40 C.F.R. § 130.2 (setting forth TDML
regulations).
203
Jocelyn B. Garovoy, “A Breathtaking Assertion of Power”? Not Quite. Pronsolino
v. Nastri and the Still Limited Role of Federal Regulation of Nonpoint Source Pollution, 30
ECOLOGY L.Q. 543, 555 (2003) (“[U]nder the Clean Water Act, it remains the responsibility
of each state to develop and enforce load allocations after EPA imposes a TMDL.”).
204
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson City. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 712–13 (1994).
205
Jeff Zenk, Millennium Bulk Terminals Longview, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY,
https://ecology.wa.gov/Regulations-Permits/SEPA/Environmental-review/SEPA-atEcology/Millennium [https://perma.cc/G3U9-UBAA] (last visited July 19, 2022).
206
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
207
Id. The EPA does not initiate this oversight process often, only 13 times since 1972
despite over 68,000 permits issued each year. See Clean Water Act: Section 404(c) “Veto
Authority,” EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/404c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8AV-T3W5] (last visited on July 19, 2022).
208
See David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to
Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and NAAQS Under the Clean Air Act, 11
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Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which are the foundation of the Act’s
many regulatory triggers, are health-based standards set without consideration of
cost or technological feasibility.209 A mandatory margin of safety is imbedded in the
Act.210 Once NAAQS are set, individual states prepare implementation plans to spell
out how they will achieve or maintain NAAQS.211 The stringency of the
implementation measures required depends on whether an airshed is meeting air
quality standards (attainment) or not meeting those standards (nonattainment).212 For
areas not in attainment, the plans must make “reasonable further progress” towards
bringing the area into attainment—the Act is designed to work towards attaining the
public health standards.213 And the layers of authority are overlapping; where states
fail to submit an approvable plan, for example, the EPA is given the power to
substitute a federal one.214
Separate from the state implementation plans, the type of control technology
that new sources or existing sources undergoing major modifications will be
required to adopt in any given airshed depends on whether that airshed meets the
NAAQS.215 Not surprisingly, new sources in nonattainment areas (those that don’t
meet the NAAQS) must comply with the most stringent of the technological
standards.216 There is more leniency in technology standards in areas that do meet
the NAAQS.217 In these ways, technology standards are tied to the quality of ambient
air, and more aggressive pollution control is required in airsheds with poor air
quality. Put slightly differently, the health-based NAAQS ultimately drive the new
source technology standards. So, despite the complexity of the Clean Air Act, the
structure is logical if one understands that the end goal of the multi-layered
regulatory system lies in ensuring the air we breathe doesn’t make us sick. Like the
TUL. ENV’T. L.J. 217, 218 (1998). For a discussion of “key statutory features” of the Clean
Air Act in support of its public health goals, see David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck &
Brandon T. Metroka, Half a Century of Supreme Court Clean Air Act Interpretation:
Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1788–
91 (2018).
209
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 492–93 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
210
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
211
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). For a brief explanation, see the EPA Website, NAAQS
Implementation
Process,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqsimplementation-process [https://perma.cc/4NAZ-UWQT] (last visited July 19, 2022).
212
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7502.
213
42 U.S.C. § 7502.
214
42 U.S.C. § 7410.
215
For a basic explanation of the New Source Review program, see Fact Sheet: New
Source Review, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-12/documents/nsrbasics
factsheet103106.pdf [https://perma.cc/64QS-AXVR] (last visited July 19, 2022).
216
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (setting out plan requirements for new sources in
nonattainment areas); id. § 7503(a)(2) (imposing LAER standards on new sources
constructed in nonattainment areas).
217
See Fact Sheet, supra note 215; 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (imposing BACT standards
on new sources constructed in attainment areas).
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Clean Water Act, stiff penalty provisions and citizen suits reinforce Congress’s
commitment to compliance.218
The ESA’s regulatory elements are also an example of cascading commands
that foster foundational aims.219 To start, the Act’s listing decisions are exclusively
scientific ones, not economic.220 Once a species is listed, the Act takes at least three
protection approaches that support species recovery and conservation.221 First, the
ESA protects both species and the habitats upon which they depend.222 Second, the
ESA creates two major classes of listed species—threatened and endangered—so
that protection is available to species before they reach the brink of extinction, thus
allowing listing of not just species in danger of extinction but also those threatened
species that are “likely to become endangered.”223 Lastly, the Act protects individual
members of a species as well as the species as a whole. For individuals, Section 9
imposes strict prohibitions against taking individual members of the listed species,

218

42 U.S.C. § 7413 (setting forth penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (allowing citizen suits).
See, e.g., Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching, 16 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
101, 106–10 (1992) (explaining how the various provisions of the ESA fit together and
concluding that “[t]he ESA thus embodies a coherent statement of national policy”); see also
J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the NoAnalog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008) (“Section 4 establishes a package of programs
aimed at identifying imperiled species . . . .”).
220
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A); see also Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the
Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
1029, 1036 (1997); Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species
Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 165, 258–59 (2006).
221
For a discussion of conservation duty and how it fits into the Act, see J.B. Ruhl,
Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the
Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENV’T L. 1107, 1107
(1995). For a discussion of the recovery goals, see Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning,
the Courts and the Endangered Species Act, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 106, 106 (2001)
(“According to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) [r]ecovery is the
cornerstone and ultimate purpose of the endangered species program.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Importantly, the recovery goals of the Act are advanced more through its
layered protections than from the Section 4(f) recovery plans themselves. See id. at 108 (“For
more than a decade environmental groups tried without success to entice federal courts into
finding the provisions of recovery plans enforceable.”). Cf. Ruhl, supra note 219, at 38
(“[R]ecovery plans are not necessarily meaningless.”).
222
See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (making the “take” of endangered species unlawful);
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (requiring designation of critical habitat). For a detailed examination
of the how the ESA protects habitat for listed species, both in theory and practice, see Dave
Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141,
149 (2012) (“The ESA’s focus on habitat is no coincidence. For decades, scientists have been
warning that habitat loss is the single most important threat to biodiversity, and Congress
was well aware of this threat when it enacted the statute.”).
223
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
219
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defining “take” broadly.224 For species-level impacts, Section 7 requires all federal
agencies to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure their actions
do not jeopardize the existence of the species or their habitat.225 This last approach—
one that sets boundaries on individual action and maintains a separate regulatory eye
on collective impacts—is similar to the Clean Air Act’s and Clean Water Act’s
regulation of stationary or point sources while also including regulatory tools aimed
squarely at ambient levels of pollution. In all, like its counterparts (that is, the other
major federal environmental statutes), the ESA is designed to engage in species
conservation at multiple levels with various regulatory methods.
Even more notoriously flexible natural resource management statutes like
NFMA (governing national forests) and FLPMA (governing national rangelands)
contain regulatory instruments and statutory commands that embody self-restraint.
The extensive, multi-level planning and inventory obligations of these statutes chafe
against wanton waste and ad hoc consumption of limited resources.226 Together they
impose an environmental consciousness through intentional planning on over 400
million acres of federal public land.227 In addition, substantive mandates actively
serve the expressly stated goals of serving “future needs”228 and ensuring that
resources meet the needs of the American people in “perpetuity.”229 To that end,
FLPMA warns against “unnecessary and undue degradation”230 and fortifies the
BLM’s authority to remove lands from grazing use despite a strong history to the

224

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (prohibiting the “take” of species); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19)
(defining “take”); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 698 (1995) (explaining why a broad reading of the take prohibition is appropriate).
Exceptions to the take prohibitions are made through permits, but those exceptions are
narrowly defined and backed by substantial process and expert analysis. See 16 U.S.C. §
1539; Goble, supra note 219, at 123 (“[A] narrow interpretation of § 10(a) is structurally
consistent with the ESA, which is characterized by broad prohibitions and narrow, welldefined exceptions.”).
225
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
226
See Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and
Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1181 (2005) [hereinafter Keiter, Public
Lands and Law Reform] (“The genesis of the current legal-planning model probably dates
from 1976 when Congress passed the NFMA and the FLPMA, giving both the Forest Service
and BLM significant new integrated resource management and planning responsibilities.”).
227
The BLM manages 244.4 million acres, and the Forest Service manages 192.9
million acres. CAROL HARDY VINCENT, LAURA A. HANSON & LUCAS F. BERMEJO, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4FS-PGGZ].
228
43 U.S.C. § 1702(c).
229
16 U.S.C. § 1600(6).
230
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (“In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation
or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands.”).
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contrary.231 NFMA more forcefully imposes a diversity mandate to conserve forests
for something other than timber.232 Both statutes recognize the multiple needs and
interests that our public lands are meant to serve, not just extractive desires. Both
statutes plan for the future and in doing so house a complex and layered process for
engaging in self-restraint. As public lands scholar Robert Keiter observed,
“[c]ombined with more detailed prescriptive standards, public participation
obligations, and judicial review opportunities, the result is a complex, highly
legalized planning and decision process for managing public resources.”233
(b) Examples of Showstoppers
Cascading regulatory commands are an important feature of environmental
statutes—one that evidences Congress’s seriousness in supporting its stated
purposes. A second major feature of these laws are the so-called “showstoppers.”
That is, the commands that prioritize environmental values over any single project.
The Clean Water Act, for instance, gives states that power over federally issued
permits through the 401 certification process and the EPA that power through the
404(c) veto authority.234 The Wilderness Act contains several prohibitions that serve
as showstoppers for development and road-building.235 Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act has long been considered a showstopper because
it prohibits the Federal Highway Administration from approving the use of land from
publicly owned parks, recreational areas, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, or public
and private historical sites unless “(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to
using that land; and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the [property] resulting from the use.”236 Likewise, the ESA is
equipped with showstoppers. As illustrated by TVA v. Hill, Section 7 can fully halt
231
Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 738 (2000) (“The FLPMA
strengthened the Department’s existing authority to remove or add land from grazing use,
allowing such modification pursuant to a land use plan . . . .” (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712,
1714)).
232
16 U.S.C. § 1604; see also George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman,
Nontimber Resources—Diversity (and Biodiversity), 2 PUB. NAT. RES. L. § 16:59 (2d ed.
2022) (“Congress evidently intended that the Forest Service treat wildlife as a ‘controlling,
co-equal factor in forest management.’ Forestry interests have argued unsuccessfully that,
despite the adoption of the NFMA, Congress intended forest production to be the
predominant use of the national forests and that the statutory diversity requirement . . .
improperly subordinated timber concerns to wildlife preservation.”).
233
Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform, supra note 226, at 1180.
234
See supra notes 205, 207 and accompanying text.
235
See National Strategy for Public Transportation Security, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c); see
also ROSS GORTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 7-5700, WILDERNESS LAWS: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES (Feb. 22, 2011) (“The Wilderness Act,
directly and by cross-reference in virtually all subsequent wilderness statutes, generally
prohibits commercial activities, motorized uses, and roads, structures, and facilities in units
of the National Wilderness Preservation System designated by acts of Congress.”).
236
49 U.S.C. 303(c).
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substantial projects if they will jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
species.237 When put to the ultimate test, the ESA is not a balancing statute. It draws
ire precisely because it has teeth.238 And yet, like many of the complex
environmental statutes, firm priorities coexist with an operational-level flexibility
that is practically necessary when dealing in issues of land use and habitat
protection.239
(c) Examples of Unidirectional Commands
In addition to the scaffolding of commands and showstoppers, there is one more
pattern of regulatory design worth considering: the unidirectional operation of
statutory commands. For example, in the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act,
the technology-forcing commands operate as one-way ratchets to reduce pollutant
loads over time. That is, they are meant to drive technological innovation within
industries such that the pollutant loading from equivalent economic productivity is
reduced over time.240 In the Clean Water Act’s commands related to water quality
standards there exists an even more straightforward expression of Congress’s
unidirectional expectations—the anti-degradation policy.241 That is, all water quality
standards are supposed to contain a statement protecting waters from further

237

See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (examining Section
7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973).
238
Jonathan H. Adler, The Science Charade in Species Conservation, 24 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 109, 111, 127 (2016) (“[The ESA] imposes significant regulatory constraints on
economic activities that may harm endangered species. . . . What is controversial about the
ESA is not that species are listed on ‘bad science,’ but that environmental activists and
progressive administrations tend to prefer a more precautionary and pro-regulatory approach
to species conservation than do many industries and anti-regulatory administrations.”).
239
The ESA, for example, allows greater flexibility in the taking of threatened species
by giving the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service the authority to adopt so-called “4(d)
regulations” to define what constitutes a take as “necessary and advisable to the conservation
of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
240
See Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental
Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944 (1994) (“American courts have generally been
reluctant to engage in radical technology-forcing in common-law nuisance actions. . . .
Partially in response to this judicial tentativeness, Congress enacted the first round of
environmental statute amendments in the early 1970s” and “spoke of the need to ‘force
technology’ to meet the needs of a more environmentally sensitive public.”).
241
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson City. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (explaining that “[a] 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act
makes clear that § 303 also contains an ‘antidegradation policy’—that is, a policy requiring
that state standards be sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters,
preventing their further degradation. Specifically, the Act permits the revision of certain
effluent limitations or water quality standards ‘only if such revision is subject to and
consistent with the antidegradation policy established under this section’”) (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B)).
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degradation.242 There are also anti-backsliding provisions applicable to individual
permits.243 Similarly, in the Clean Air Act, the prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD) program emerged from the concept that areas already meeting ambient air
quality standards for criteria pollutants should be regulated so as to maintain their
air quality.244
The ESA, albeit in a different setting, is structurally designed towards
recovery245 by imposing a conservation duty on all federal agencies246 and providing
protection to endangered and threatened species,247 as well as their habitat.248
Likewise, the BLM, in overseeing 245 million acres of public lands under the
mandates of FLMPA, is told to keep forward momentum in land health by
preventing “unnecessary and undue degradation.”249 And though not quite as
directed of a mandate, the Forest Service, in order to keep national forests from
becoming “tree farms,” is tasked with “provid[ing] for diversity of plant and animal
communities” in NMFA’s so-called diversity mandate.250
Unidirectional expectations, showstoppers, scaffolded protections—these are
all manifestations of the intentionality of environmental law. Add to that the citizen

242

See 40 C.F.R. 131.6(d) (stating that EPA regulations require state water quality
standards to meet the antidegradation policy standards set out in section 131.12).
243
33 U.S.C 1342(o).
244
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492; Env’t Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 567–
68 (2007) (explaining that the PSD program was “aimed at giving added protection to air
quality in certain parts of the country ‘notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of’ the
NAAQS”); see also Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: ControlCompelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (providing a brief summary
of the PSD program’s origin story).
245
16 U.S.C. 1531(b) (declaring the purpose of the Act to conserve listed species and
their habitat); 16 U.S.C. 1531(c)(3) (defining “conserve” to mean “bring[ing] any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary”); cf. J. Michael Scott, Dale D. Goble, Leona
K. Svancara, & Anna Pidgorna, By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY, VOLUME 1: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 35 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael
Scott & Frank W. Davis, eds., 2006), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usgsstaffpub/719
[https://perma.cc/QYQ4-RATM] (“Our findings suggest that success [of the ESA] is a
continuum (J. M. Scott et al., forthcoming) but that delisting or downlisting are widely
accepted measures.”).
246
See Goble, supra note 219 and accompanying text.
247
See supra notes 222–225 and accompanying text.
248
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
249
43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).
250
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). For an explanation of what the diversity mandate was
meant to accomplish in light of the legislative history of NFMA, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON
AND H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS
173 (1987) (“[S]ection 6(g)(3)(B) has three complementary meanings in the context of
timber planning. . . . These three elements, when taken together, require the Forest Service
to look at the forest as an ecological whole and to ensure that, over time, the forest is not
converted to a ‘tree farm.’”).
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suit provisions and stiff penalties and one can’t help but take environmental law
seriously as a project of self-preservation through collective action.251
C. The Long Arc of Environmental Law’s Intentionality
So far, this Part has offered up a view of environmental law as an exoskeleton—
drawing on the collective suite of environmental laws to underscore a pattern of
enduring commitment to self-restraint. In urging that view, this Part has looked
chiefly to the major federal environmental statutes, both individually and
collectively, including their text and the substantial legal infrastructure created by
them, and their broad purpose statements and detailed regulatory choices.
To see that environmental law codifies a commitment to self-restraint, it is
useful to look beyond law and beyond the relatively narrow timeframe in which
several keystone statutes were enacted; one has to situate the environmental laws of
the 1970s in a deeper, longer history of America’s relationship with nature. In doing
so, one can start to appreciate environmental law as a decades-long shift in American
thinking away from unbridled consumption and towards intentional self-restraint.
1. The Common Narrative of Environmental Law
In telling the story of environmental law’s emergence in the U.S., many
commentators start with the late 1960s and early 1970s.252 Richard Lazarus, in his
book Making Environmental Law, starts his legal history in 1965.253 Environmental
law textbooks, too, routinely focus on the 1970s as the moment of conception despite
251

See Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedying the Misuse of Nature, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 141,
150 (2012) (“[O]ur willingness to accept an impressive amount of environmental regulation
reflects a common understanding that some limits on industrial society and land use are
necessary to preserve a healthy civilization.”); see also Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in
the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25
B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 347, 385 (1998) (“The whole body of environmental laws that have
been enacted over the course of the past forty years are a testament to that policy and to the
willingness of society to exact economic costs for the sake of that policy. . . . [These laws]
demonstrate the movement of society toward the understanding that preservation and
protection of our natural environment is a positive value, and a widespread one.”).
252
See BROOKS, supra note 43, at 5 (“Most histories have conventionally dated
American environmental law’s emergence to the ‘environmental decade’ of the 1970s,
trigged by a handful of publicized events that occurred in the late 1960s.”); see also id. at
127. Of course, many scholars—including Lazarus—have also recognized the deeper roots
of environmental law. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 61, at 814 (“Environmental law, as a
field of study and legal practice, arose long after environmental problems entered the
consciousness of American leaders and policy makers.”).
253
See LAZARUS, MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 21, at 52–53 (“By the
1960s, Congress was ready and able to enact a series of new environmental statutes . . . .
Congress also passed a host of laws in the 1960s that, while more consumer oriented in their
focus, simultaneously served as important legislative precedents for 1970s environmental
legislation.”).

42

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

obligatory nods to common law origins.254 Dan Tarlock, as he sets out to uncover
whether environmental law has a substantive essence, asserts that environmental law
was created out of “whole cloth” in the late 1960s.255
There are good reasons why the common narrative focuses on the early 1970s
as the genesis of environmental law. After all, the Santa Barbara Oil Spill fouled
California waters in 1969.256 The Cuyahoga River caught on fire (yet again) in
1969.257 The dangers of DDT and other toxins were painfully exposed in the
publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962.258 The First Earth Day ignited
a broad movement of concerned scientists, teachers, students, doctors, politicians,
and pastors in April 1970.259 And, of course, the frameworks of the major federal
environmental statutes were enacted in the wake of this acute environmental
consciousness: The Wilderness Act of 1964,260 NEPA of 1969,261 the Clean Air Act
of 1970,262 the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972,263 TSCA of 1976,264 NFMA
of 1976,265 and FLPMA of 1976.266
It was a busy decade to be sure. The environment was top of mind in America.
In January 1970, President Richard Nixon “dedicated one-third of his State of the
Union address to environmental problems.”267 And that was in the middle of the
Vietnam War.268
Unfortunately, the common narrative—that environmental law was largely a
product of the 1970s—leaves an impression that there is no durable commitment to
environmental stewardship in the United States; that the law was a product of a
certain era, and that environmental law is simply a collection of ad hoc reactions to
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BROOKS, supra note 43, at 9.
Tarlock, supra note 58, at 215.
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LYNN G. LLEWELLYN & CLARE PEISER, NAT’L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, NEPA AND
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY 4 (1973), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist
pubs/Legacy/IR/nbsir73-218.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY89-4NS4] (“In the final analysis, the
loss of the Torrey Canyon, the Santa Barbara spill, and other subsequent incidents appeared
to have considerable impact on public opinion.”).
257
Mark Urycki, 50 Years Later: Cuyahoga River Called Poster Child for Clean Water
Act, NPR (June 18, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/733615959/50-yearslater-burning-cuyahoga-river-called-poster-child-for-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/ZA
D4-XU5Z].
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See CARSON, supra note 40.
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See ROME, supra note 41, at 165–208.
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Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136).
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Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347).
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Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7675).
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Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1389).
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Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629).
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Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614).
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Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787).
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Urycki, supra note 257.
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palpable environmental disasters. For some, this narrative feeds into the conclusion
that environmental law is immature and that there is no “there there.”269
2. Beyond the Common Narrative
The common narrative may be a shorthand way of talking about environmental
law’s history, but it is not complete. In taking a longer view of environmental law
and placing it in the broader context of conservation and economic discourse, in
assembling both the dominant and not-so voices of the past, a more robust story
emerges.
Focusing specifically on the post-war time period of 1945 to 1970,
environmental historian Karl Boyd Brooks advances directly the thesis that
environmental law’s roots emerged long before the 1970s.270 With the Great
Depression and WWII in the rear-view, Brooks describes the 1940s as a time when
fewer citizens accepted that “professionals” would adequately deal with the growing
environmental crisis.271 Instead of sitting idly by, citizens called for new laws to
ensure commitments to curbing unbridled resource use and pollution.272 The calls
were answered, in statutes and common law, at the state and federal level.273
In that post-war period, several federal statutes were adopted in rapid
succession: the 1946 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act;274 the 1947 Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act;275 the 1948 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act;276 the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act;277 the “the Delaney Clause” of
the 1958 Food and Drug Act Amendments;278 the 1960 Multiple Use/Sustained
Yield Act;279 and other lesser-known statutes as well.280 Like the environmental
statutes adopted in the 1970s, these laws addressed a range of resources including
toxics, water pollution, air pollution, and public land use. They also introduced
science and informational transparency as a backbone of environmental decisionmaking.281 In one form or another, the laws of the postwar era laid the legal
269

Tarlock, supra note 58, at 217.
BROOKS, supra note 43, at 6 (“Environmental law did not appear in a revolutionary
moment of intense national creativity after 1969.”).
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Id. at 38–39.
272
Id. at 35–36 (“This old-fashioned belief in postwar consensus overstates the
American public’s passivity in the face of environmental challenges . . . . Recent social and
cultural studies of postwar America have punctured older stereotypes of bland unity, suggest
a better appreciation of postwar environmental politics’ sharper edge.”).
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Id. at 38–39.
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Pub. L. No. 79-732, 60 Stat. 1080.
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Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163.
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Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.
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Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
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Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 409(c)(3)(A), 72 Stat. 1786.
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Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215.
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BROOKS, supra note 43, at 58–59.
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Id. at 7, 38, 43–45, 50.
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groundwork for modern environmental regulation.282 This is a very different story
than one where environmental law was simply a product of the 1970s appearing
from “whole cloth.”283
Not only were the comprehensive environmental statutes of the 1970s rooted
in earlier federal laws, but the federal laws often had even deeper roots at the state
level and in common law.284 To that end, the timing and trends of federal
environmental protection and natural resource management statutes tell only part of
the story. At the state level, citizens, legislators, and regulators worked at the
forefront of creating legal frameworks to address major environmental issues.285
Those efforts often later translated into broader national legislation.286
Even before American concerns for environmental degradation were codified
in law, the common law provided increasingly fertile ground for elevating public
interests over private.287 Indeed, despite the comprehensive web of environmental
legislation in existence, common law doctrines of public nuisance law and public
trust doctrine are still deployed with vigor and regularity.288
The cultural shifts that Brooks highlights for the postwar period are further
contextualized and rooted in even deeper history by the work of prominent
environmental historian Donald Worster.289 In Shrinking the Earth, Worster traces
the nascent calls for conservation in America to George Marsh and his publication
of Man and Nature in 1864.290 It was a “doomsday warning, announcing that the
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Id. at 128 (“Federal environmental lawmaking did surge in the 1970s. Congress and
executive branch agencies made volumes of new laws. Yet the most important laws––
especially keystones as the 1972 ‘Clean Water Act’ and the 1970 ‘Clean Air Act’––ratified
jurisdictional shifts that began at least a decade or more earlier.”).
283
Cf. Tarlock, supra note 58, at 215.
284
Id. at 130 (explaining how environmental law scholar William H. Rodgers had
recognized in his 1977 treatise on environmental law that many of the federal legislative
efforts of the 1970s were “still . . . rooted deeply in the past, expressing principles well
accepted for generations”).
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The story of the Clean Air Act’s emergence on the federal scene is retold by Brooks
to emphasize this precise point. See BROOKS, supra note 43, at 63, 133–34 (“During the ‘long
decade’ between 1947 and 1960—an era that historians have conventionally dismissed as
environmentally indifferent—Californians’ air quality lawmaking generated a sophisticated
regulatory system.”).
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See Sagoff, supra note 56, at 32 (“For centuries, common law courts have protected
individuals from injuries of the sort typically caused by pollution.”).
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Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory
State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 547 (2007) (“[C]hallenges facing today’s efforts to enact and
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See WORSTER, supra note 1.
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Id. at 78–80.
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species must learn to live within limits of the earth or lose its civilization.”291 And,
importantly for his role in the eventual emergence of environmental law, Marsh
called for government to facilitate restraint: “Conservation required a stronger
government informed by science and awakened to its responsibilities to legislate,
preserve, and regulate on behalf of all the people and indeed all forms of life.”292
While it would take time for the role of government in conservation to take the
shape it holds today, the outlines of that shape became more palpable at the turn of
the twentieth century. Even at that time, when many believed natural resources were
incapable of exhaustion, there were leaders in thought and politics that counseled
for planning and restraint, for preservation and deliberate use.293 Consider President
Theodore Roosevelt and his vision for protecting public spaces. Roosevelt took
seriously the threat of resource exhaustion. He called for change and did more than
his presidential counterparts had or would to ensure the U.S. government played a
role in protecting resources for the future.294 By creating the system of wildlife
refuges in 1903, setting aside public lands as national monuments (including land
that would eventually become the Grand Canyon National Park), Roosevelt earned
his reputation as one of the most important political figures in U.S. history to protect
and preserve land for future generations.295
Aside Roosevelt stood the likes of John Muir296 and Gifford Pinchot.297 And
before them, George Marsh.298 And after them, numerous intellectual voices—
Fairfield Osborn, William Vogt, and Aldo Leopold—would continue to warn of
nature’s limits and call for a conservation ethic.299 Indeed, there have always been
those who have had the courage of conviction to counsel for deliberate decisionmaking aimed at utilizing nature’s bounty to achieve “the greatest good for the
greatest number of people for the longest period of time.”300

291
Id. at 80; see also id. at 81 (“Marsh’s book represents an important intellectual
moment in the transition from an age of plenty to an age of limits.”).
292
Id. at 85.
293
Just one year before President Roosevelt proclaimed “[t]he time has come for a
change” in the unconstrained approach to natural resource use, id. at 108–09, Simon Patten,
a professor of political economy at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of
Finance, declared in The New Basis of Civilization that “scarcity belonged to the past . . . .”
Id. at 91.
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Id. at 111.
295
Worster observes that “[n]o one did more to conserve wild nature for its own sake.”
Id. He further noted, “Roosevelt gave his country the greatest expanse of protected public
spaces on the planet. . . .” Id.
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Muir, though a friend of Roosevelt, disagreed with his brand of conservation, opting
instead for a conservation ethic that did not firstly attempt to preserve technocratic promises
of continued abundance. Id. at 115, 119.
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Id. at 88, 110, 117.
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Id. at 84–85.
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Id. at 139–41, 200.
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Id. at 113 (quoting William John McGee and discussing his influence on Roosevelt
and the first head of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot).
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Of course, lost in this recounting are the less admirable, and sometimes outright
troubling, personalities and beliefs that animated some influential thinkers.301 Also
lost in the list of oft-celebrated giants are marginalized voices—of women, of
indigenous communities, and of the economically or racially oppressed—who
offered valuable insights on the need for and methods of conservation but whose
voices have taken longer to be heard. In addition to the illuminating science and
advocacy work of Rachel Carson, for over 60 years, biologist Jane Goodall, armed
with binoculars and curiosity, has reshaped human insights about our relationship
with the natural world.302 Then there is the American political economist Elinor
Ostrom, who challenged conventional wisdom by showing that we should look
beyond the market versus state dichotomy when considering how to manage
common pool resources against overexploitation.303 Sociologist Robert Bullard,
sometimes referred to as “the father of environmental justice,” used his expertise to
shine a light on racial disparities in exposure to environmental pollution.304 There
are many others too, like Winona La Duke305 and Warren Washington,306 whose
work through advocacy and science has shaped views on the environment.
This Article does not portend to fill the gaps of under-recognized contributions
of marginalized voices, if even one could. But, in assembling some of the voices,
one can appreciate that there is a long and rich history of calls for conservation.
There is also a long and rich history of tension between accepting natural limits and
pressing for endless growth. Indeed, many prominent classical economists have
recognized those limits.307 How many people pause to recall that when Adam Smith
wrote The Wealth of Nations in 1776, he accepted economic growth was assuredly
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limited by nature’s capital?308 Or that John Stuart Mill accepted that natural limits
would not necessarily be a bad thing?309 Or that Stanley Jevons cautioned that
coalfields—“undeniably powerful”—were “gifts of nature,” not machines?310 These
are the same hard facts that Herman Daly recounts in the modern era.311
Still, calls for stewardship routinely encountered resistance by those who
viewed conservation as a threat to economic growth and development.312 Those
voices and the growing appetite for conservation continued to compete with
America’s economic thirst and steadfast commitment to economic growth, just as it
had at the turn of the century.313 Even Roosevelt urged that “conservation means
development as much as it does protection.”314
This tension between economic growth and accepting biophysical limits of
growth is consistent with the findings of social scientists who have suggested that
environmentalism exists as a counterweight to the so-called dominant paradigm of
“faith in material abundance and support for private property rights, a laissez-faire
economy, and limited government regulation.”315
So how do the historical accounts by Worster and Brooks highlighted here
further the claim that environmental law is an exoskeleton, an intentional
codification of a cultural shift decades in the making? Putting insights from Brooks
and Worster together, the common narrative of environmental law’s creation would
expand in a few notable ways.
First, the narrative ought to recognize that environmental laws emerged as a
codified part of American life earlier; laws intentionally aimed at bettering air and
water quality, controlling toxics, and managing public lands resources beyond
extraction interests appeared on the books well before the 1970s.316 And it is not just
that such laws were adopted before the 1970s, but that they were consistently
adopted in a post-industrial America. That suggests they were not an aberration but
part of the progression of a well-ordered society.
Second, while environmental laws embody values, law did not create values.
Rather, the stewardship values embodied in law are the cultural culmination of many
decades’ shift in thinking.317 As reflected by Worster’s work recounting of a rich
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and long intellectual discourse on natural limits, the laws that emerged in the 1960s
and 1970s found momentum across far more diverse voices than the common
narrative of environmental law’s alleged birth in the 1970s acknowledges.318 In that
sense, they codify a deeper and more deliberate shift in the management of the
natural world.319
Finally, the values embodied in environmental laws were not easily accepted.
Because they ran counter to powerful economic interests, one can also appreciate
the political inertia that would be required to codify self-restraint through
environmental law. If one appreciates that, one can more easily see that
environmental laws are intentional and should be given due weight as a collective
and repeated choice to heed the extractive and absorptive limits of nature.
II. BRINGING A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S PATTERNS,
PURPOSE, AND REPEATED CHOICES INTO JUDICIAL DISCOURSE
Part I embraces a view of environmental law not as a sideshow interest or
fleeting product of a time, but as an intentional and indispensable piece of the
ongoing settling of America. The technical details of the statutes might be complex,
but the purposes that the major laws are meant to achieve are eerily direct.
What does that mean, practically speaking, for the implementation of
environmental law? How should a deeper understanding of environmental law’s
patterns, infrastructure, purpose, and historical context become translated into
regulatory decision-making or judicial discourse?
While a complete answer to those questions is part of a larger project, this Part
urges courts to approach environmental law with greater respect for its intentionality
in three ways. First, by taking judicial notice of environmental law’s exoskeleton—
that is to recognize its role as a collective body of laws intended to set boundaries
on degradation. Second, by giving weight to enacted purpose statements in judicial
review and statutory interpretation. Third, by placing a thumb on the scale for agency
decisions that err on the side of caution, or by adopting a more protective approach
to human health and the environment.
Each of these suggestions advance a more sophisticated approach to the
collective and individual aims of environmental statutes when faced with the task of
parsing out the meaning of individual words and provisions. Indeed, courts that fail
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to understand environmental laws in their collective context risk taking too narrow
a view and thus undermining the remarkably straightforward values of
environmental law.
A. Take Judicial Notice of the Exoskeleton
Richard Lazarus has argued that the Supreme Court would benefit from a more
sophisticated understanding of environmental law:
The Justices simply do not perceive environmental law beyond its
expression in some formal statutory enactments and its presentation of yet
another incidental context for their resolution of what are the truly
significant crosscutting issues of law and lawmaking processes. They lack
any special appreciation or caring for the ends environmental law seeks to
accomplish or for the challenges for lawmaking institutions and processes
presented by the problems addressed by environmental law.320
To reduce this blind spot, Lazarus urges judges to approach environmental law
as a distinct body of law that is intended to resolve a particularly complex set of
interconnected injuries.321
Taking judicial notice of environmental law’s exoskeleton would also move
the judiciary towards greater sophistication in this area—but not because
environmental law is defined by the complexity of its injuries so much as because
environmental law is defined by the tenacity of its response to those injuries. A
sophisticated understanding of environmental law is not just a function of
appreciating uniquely complex injuries, as Lazarus suggests, but also a function of
understanding environmental law as a body of laws serving as an intentional
counterweight to a dominant economic paradigm and to the degradation that comes
from unregulated use of common resources. In other words, if one understands that
the whole point of environmental law is to impose self-restraint for the common
good, one is less likely to fight the reality that environmental regulations often
constrain private behavior.
What would taking judicial notice of environmental law’s exoskeleton look
like? When resolving issues of environmental law, judges would check their
inclination to zoom in and microscope issues as technical or isolated pieces. This is
not to say that careful and detailed work isn’t also necessary, but the first move
should be understanding where the narrow issue fits into the larger landscape.
Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner have observed that “[p]erhaps no
interpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon,
which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its
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structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”322 Much longer
ago, taking a broad view, James McCauley Landis urged in Statutes and Sources of
Law that judges seek to distill the purpose of a law and use that distillation to
advance the law.323 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks too expressed an impulse to
understand purpose at a broader level: “The purpose of a statute must always be
treated as including not only an immediate purpose or group of related purposes but
a larger and subtler purpose as to how the particular statute is to be fitted into the
legal system as a whole.”324
Robert Adler and Brian House have examined this tendency of “atomization”
in the context of the Clean Water Act’s conduit cases, arguing that “excessive focus
on individual words or phrases (the ‘atoms’ or ‘molecules’ in the text) prevents the
reader from understanding how those words or phrases relate to the whole
statute.”325 In a similar vein, I urge that the patterns of repeated choices in
environmental law—its exoskeleton—can aid in the distillation of a statute’s
purpose.
Doing so would not be a radical notion. The Supreme Court has on occasion
considered the legal landscape in which a particular statute is situated in order to
take stock of Congressional intent. For instance, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson,
the Court looked to a broader statutory landscape in the area of tobacco regulation
when deciding whether Congress intended to give the Federal Drug Administration
the power to regulate tobacco as a drug under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA).326 The Court understood that “[i]n determining whether Congress has
spoken directly to the FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco, we must also consider in
greater detail the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over the past
35 years.”327 In this way, the Court explained that “the meaning of one statute may
be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and
more specifically to the topic at hand.”328 Specifically, the Court considered the
patchwork of laws that Congress had enacted to regulate various aspects of tobacco
322
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to ascertain whether Congress intended to give the Food and Drug Administration
power to regulate tobacco under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.329 In other words,
Congress’s behavior and regulatory history with respect to tobacco informed the
intended scope of the statute at issue.
Lower courts too have sought insight to congressional intent asking how
various statutes fit together. For example, in response to a citizen suit brought under
the Clean Water Act involving releases from coal ash ponds, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals looked to “other environmental statutes [to] demonstrate why adopting
either of Plaintiffs’ theories of liability would be untenable.”330 Specifically, the
court looked to the relationship between the Clean Water Act and RCRA, which are
to be read as “complementary statutes.”331 The court reasoned that “coal ash is solid
waste, and RCRA is specifically designed to cover solid waste.”332 Regulating the
release at issue under the Clean Water Act, therefore, would undermine the
regulatory mechanisms devised by Congress since jurisdiction under RCRA and the
Clean Water Act are mutually exclusive by statute.333 In reaching this conclusion,
the court also took note of the fact that the EPA had adopted a regulation covering
coal ash storage and treatment under RCRA.334 In this way, the court looked beyond
some narrow, atomized terms in the Clean Water Act to aid its interpretation.335
Of course, one should be careful not to engage in a reflexive or wholesale
adoption of the landscape level approach to statutory interpretation applied in cases
like FDA v. Brown & Williamson. Looking outside the principal statute would be
inappropriate, for example, if used as a method for undercutting congressional intent
as expressed in the text of the relevant statute. For an example of what not to do, one
might consider the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA, in which the
Court takes a step back from detailed statutory analysis by invoking the major
questions doctrine and asking more simply whether Congress spoke with enough
specificity to conclude that the EPA has the power under the Clean Air Act’s Section
111(d) to regulate existing power plants using beyond the fenceline measures.336
Unlike in Brown & Williamson, and unlike the methodology advanced here, in West
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Virginia v. EPA the Court claimed to understand Congressional intent by looking at
less text, not more.337
Likewise, none of this is to say that some general concept of an exoskeleton
could ever trump specific statutory text, just like statements of purpose don’t trump
specific text.338 At the same time, however, the enacted purpose statements, the
unidirectional trendlines, the fortification of substantive mandates with beefed up
enforcement authorities and citizen suits—these are the features of many
environmental laws that reflect a normative bent of statutes to protect environmental
and human health. That normative bent, in turn, puts an important bumper on the
range of acceptable agency decisions even when legislative commands contain less
precision and more discretion.339 Understanding that normative bent as an
intentional and important piece of the American blueprint should make it clear that
the laws mean what they say.
Senator Orrin Hatch from Utah once remarked that “[t]ext without context
often invites confusion and judicial adventurism.”340 The exoskeleton of
environmental law can provide a much-needed reference point for anyone who sits
at the crossroads of a contentious environmental dispute with competing cultural
interests at stake. Knowing that environmental law is, by design and necessity, a
counterweight to dominant economic impulses can help illuminate why sometimes
judicial restraint in environmental law is itself a form of judicial activism.341
B. Give Enacted Purpose Statements Appropriate Weight
Of all the ways that courts could give effect to environmental law’s
exoskeleton, the most straightforward is to give weight to enacted purpose
statements on issues of statutory interpretation and judicial review of agency
decisions. For instance, when the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill342 took seriously
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congressional intent to give protection of endangered species “the highest of
priorities,” the Court gave appropriate weight to the animating values of the ESA.343
Some are sure to bristle at the simplicity of this suggestion. After all, many
environmental statutes are complex and technical in their details. It is not hard to
find incongruities within the text of statutes whose purpose statement is otherwise
straightforward. This is because environmental problems are necessarily intertwined
with social problems and economic consequences; environmental laws all grapple
at some level with striking the balance between the present and future, planning and
flexibility, and precaution and overregulation. The Clean Air Act, for instance, sets
health-based, cost-blind air quality standards for certain criteria pollutants.344 Those
standards trigger other regulatory requirements under the Act, some of which require
the EPA to take cost into account, like when it decides what constitutes best available
control technology for stationary source emissions.345 Also, there are provisions that
are silent on the issue of cost, like those dealing with mercury emissions.346 In these
multilayered webs of statutory instruction, discerning a singular priority can be
difficult.
Skepticism over placing too much weight on purpose statements is also to be
expected given that anyone familiar with the legislative process knows that statutes
are products of politics and compromise. Indeed, leading legal process theorists like
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks347 have been roundly criticized over many decades for
suggesting that a singular purpose can be ascribed to enacted legislation or that
legislators can be treated as reasonable people.348
And yet, despite the difficulties in discerning a singular purpose from
congressionally enacted statutes, there are good reasons to place substantial weight
on the enacted purpose statements of individual statutes. First, it is even more
difficult to find a path through the trees if one reads a statute as a series of detailed
and disjointed commands. The enacted purpose statements are useful as guides, even
if rough ones, in testing whether a proffered statutory interpretation or policy choice
is placing the emphasis on the right syllable of congressional intent. In this way,
enacted purpose statements are important textual tethers. They provide judges and
regulators with an explicit benchmark for measuring the relative validity or
desirability of competing interpretations and decisions. Second, there is no reason to
think that purpose statements should be ignored simply because they are
nontechnical in nature. Quite the opposite. The plainspoken forthrightness of many
343
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purpose statements may be precisely the reason they should be taken seriously.349
More than any other statutory provision, purpose statements are often a simple
statement of values. Because these statements are not likely to have been overlooked
by legislators, the statements can be especially insightful on questions of
congressional intent.350
In his article Enacted Legislative Findings and Purpose, Jarrod Shobe similarly
urges judges to bring enacted findings and purposes into the fold of statutory
interpretation.351 Though his focus is broader than environmental law, Shobe too
observes that “[e]nacted findings and purposes are also less voluminous and more
homogeneous than unenacted legislative history, so they are unlikely to have
‘something for everybody’ in the way unenacted legislative history sometimes
does.”352 In other words, enacted findings and purposes offer more genuine insight
into the law’s intent. Moreover, Shobe attributes meaning to the fact that enacted
findings and purpose are “prominently included at the beginning of the statutory text
Congress votes on, so it is less susceptible to manipulation and is uniquely reliable
and attributable to Congress as a whole.”353 Indeed, other scholars have explained
that members of Congress engage with the legislative process at the level of
generality that is characteristic of purpose statements; the detailed provisions, by
contrast, are written by technical drafters and not necessarily the subject of focused
attention by the members of Congress.354
Kevin Stack goes further and makes the case for an “enacted purposes canon”
of statutory construction.355 In particular, Stack starts with the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in King v. Burwell that “[w]e cannot interpret federal statutes to
negate their own stated purposes.”356 He then traces the lineage of jurisprudential
tradition that has long given effect to statutory purpose as a legitimate tool of
construction. In fact, Stack argues that “[i]n a sense, there already is an enacted
purposes canon; the Court just has not expressly identified it as such.”357 Moreover,
349
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Stack would have judges implement the canon to narrow the range of permissible
choices available to agencies under a statute—only those regulatory choices that are
consistent with the detailed statutory language and further the purpose of the statute
would be considered permissible.358 This is precisely the technique of interpretation
that is necessary for respecting the exoskeleton of environmental law.
Properly understood, the approach to statutory interpretation advanced here
does not reside solely in the purposivist camp. The approach advanced here should
have equal appeal to textualists.359 In fact, Justice Antonin Scalia, a modern
proponent of textualism, conceded the relevance of purpose statements in statutory
construction and has relied on such statements to exclude statutory interpretations
that would negate the purpose.360 This makes sense, of course. As Stack poignantly
explains, many of the common critiques levied against Hart and Sacks fall away
when a statute contains a formal purpose statement.361 More specifically, critics of
the purposivist approach often focus on whether a driving purpose can be discerned
when no formal statement is offered by Congress.362
Given that purpose statements in environmental statutes are codified in law
alongside the more detailed statutory commands,363 environmental statutes do not
generally suffer from that problem and the underlying critiques of Hart and Sacks
simply would not apply. In fact, the use of enacted purposes in statutory
interpretation is simply an uncontroversial application of a well-regarded canon of
interpretation—the “whole act” rule.364 That rule recognizes that courts “must not
interpret provisions of a statute in isolation,” but rather in the context of the statute
as a whole.365
Seen in that light, the real cause for concern may be the failure to properly
consider the enacted purpose statement. Shobe puts a finer point on it: “Courts
should engage in these types of inquiries when congressional findings and purposes
are enacted rather than confining themselves to more narrowly focused arguments
about specific meanings of isolated terms, based on dictionaries, canons, legislative
history, and other unenacted sources, while ignoring important parts of the enacted
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text.”366 Indeed, as Stack noted, “[b]y adhering to a statute’s enacted purposes, courts
reach interpretations of statutes that, in general, are more public-regarding.”367
Still, it is true that purpose statements alone may not provide a definitive
compass to decisional outcomes—and that is not the view urged here. But, just as a
broad purpose statement cannot provide a definitive answer to a nuanced issue of
statutory interpretation, neither can a narrow lens on statutory text provide a
definitive answer to a complex problem of public health or resource conservation.
The view urged here is one of judges as skilled diagnosticians of the law. Like fitting
the pieces of the puzzle, judges assemble a coherent view of the law not just by
examining the zoomed-in view of particular statutory provisions but also by placing
that text and the dispute in the context of the statute’s structure, history, and—
importantly—purpose. The view urged here is to understand the purpose of
environmental laws as a deliberate societal commitment to restraint.
C. Place a Thumb on the Scale for Precaution in the Face of Uncertainty
A slightly more radical, but still textually rooted, implication of environmental
law’s exoskeleton is the idea that courts ought to give direct effect to the
precautionary nature of environmental law by placing a thumb on the scale of agency
decisions that err on the side of caution. Such an approach is most useful when issues
of scientific uncertainty lie at the heart of an agency’s decision to regulate or not
regulate. A precautionary approach would give agencies greater latitude to regulate
in the face of scientific uncertainty if doing so were consistent with the commands
of the statute. Conversely, courts following a precautionary approach would be more
skeptical of claims by agencies or private parties that use scientific uncertainty as a
justification for inaction.
Notably, this approach is asymmetric: Courts would afford agencies flexibility
to regulate in the face of scientific uncertainty, but they would give less latitude to
agencies who rely on that same uncertainty to justify regulatory inaction. That
approach is asymmetric because the laws are asymmetric. The laws have an
intentional ethical bend that favors self-restraint and precaution. By nature,
precaution expresses a preference for regulation in the face of uncertainty. In
contrast, there is no statutory preference for regulatory inaction. Indeed, regulatory
inaction is detrimental to the aims of most environmental laws. And so, to give effect
to that exoskeleton, courts must learn to approach regulatory inaction with a
skeptical eye.
That courts put a thumb on the scale for regulating in the face of uncertainty
should not be so hard to accept and is not necessarily new. It would actually be a
throwback to the 1970s when judges like Skelly Wright and Harold Leventhal were
weighing the appropriate role of courts in a new era of environmental statutes.368 In
366
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a case well-known for observing the precautionary nature of the Clean Air Act, Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, Judge Skelly Wright wrote for an en banc court and articulated an
approach similar to the one suggested here: “Where a statute is precautionary in
nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public
health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not demand rigorous
step-by-step proof of cause and effect.”369
In that case, the EPA used its power under the Clean Air Act to regulate lead
from gasoline upon finding, as required by statute, that the addition of lead to
gasoline “will endanger the public health and welfare.”370 Various lead additive
manufacturers and gasoline refiners challenged the regulation on the grounds that
the EPA had to show proof of actual harm rather than a substantial risk of harm in

These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a flood of
new litigation—litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural
environment. Several recently enacted statutes attest to the commitment of the
Government to control, at long last, the destructive engine of material “progress.”
But it remains to be seen whether the promise of this legislation will become a
reality. Therein lies the judicial role . . . . Our duty, in short, is to see that important
legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected
in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). Judge Leventhal too saw the role of courts
as one of upholding the public interest values of the new statutes of that era. He wrote:
Under the current arrangement the courts no longer have the major role they
once discharged in the direction formulation of the pertinent legal rules . . .
Primary responsibility has been vested in executive officials and independent
regulatory agencies. But this is not to say that the courts do not have an important
role. They have a role of review which has been of major significance. In
exercising this role, they have shared the public sense of urgency reflected in the
new laws, and working within the framework of existing legal doctrine, have
exerted a pervasive influence over the legislation’s implementation.
Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 510 (1974); see also Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy
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satisfies the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.” Id.
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order to meet the regulatory threshold.371 In other words, industry was calling for
scientific certainty as a precondition to regulation.
Rejecting that claim, the court emphasized the precautionary nature of the
Clean Air Act and the necessity of acting before environmental harms materialize:
“A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is, necessarily, a
precautionary statute. Regulatory action may be taken before the threatened harm
occurs; indeed, the very existence of such precautionary legislation would seem to
demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived
threat.”372 Just as important, Judge Wright understood that insisting upon certainty
would undermine the intent of the legislation given that “[a]waiting certainty will
often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulation.”373
This sentiment was hardly limited to a single case, court, or statute. Other
courts and other cases in that era reflected a more widely shared judicial
understanding that the precautionary nature of many environmental statutes
necessarily supported the ability of regulators to adopt preventative regulation in the
face of “conflicting and inconclusive evidence.”374 In one case, Judge Bazelon went
so far as to suggest that interests concerning personal life, health and liberty have a
“special claim to judicial protection.”375 Judge Wright echoed that view a few years
later in Ethyl Corp., recognizing “the special judicial interest in favor of protection
of the health and welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does not exist.”376
While some might criticize this view as endorsing judicial activism—that is,
encouraging judicial preference for certain values—nothing could be further from
truth. Rather, giving effect to precaution in environmental law is simply the act of
giving effect to congressional intent. Put differently, a court that is mindful of the
precautionary nature and special values animating environmental law is hardly
engaged in activism—it is just doing its job. In his book, Regulating from Nowhere,
Douglas Kysar recognizes the precautionary principles animating environmental law
and warns that these “normative dimensions” cannot be displaced by the objective
371
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frameworks of welfare economics or cost-benefit analysis.377 Similarly, Part I argues
that the text, legal infrastructure, and history of environmental law together
illuminate a deliberate and legislatively backed normative preference for restraint.
If these views are given weight, judicial activism surely does not lie in giving effect
to the law’s normative dimension, but rather, lays in failing to do so.378
Giving effect to the precautionary nature of environmental law should not be
confused with writing agencies, or courts, a blank check. As the court in Ethyl Corp.
recognized, the EPA is not free to adopt baseless or purposeless regulation.379
Likewise, the court was not free to rubber stamp any regulatory decision purporting
to reduce harm. Rather, the court engaged in a careful review of the statutory text
and legislative history to support Congress’s intent to endorse a precautionary
approach.380 Then, satisfied that the statute is of a sort that would support regulation
in the absence of scientific certainty or actual harm, the court took a hard look at the
factual support for the agency’s decision.381 That is not to say that the court played
the role of scientist or risk analyst. Instead, the court afforded the agency flexibility
to weigh the risks of harm based on the science that was available, and to ultimately
decide to regulate.382
The approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl Corp.—that is, an approach
that gives effect to the precautionary nature of an environmental statute by allowing
regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty—complements the institutional
competency of courts and the stated function of arbitrary and capricious review. This
approach saves courts from being the arbiters of science, which moves courts beyond
their core competencies, by allowing greater flexibility to the agency so long as the
regulation would advance the purposes and general precautionary nature of the
relevant statute. The precautionary approach, in other words, is a kind of heuristic
that allows a court to more simply ensure that the regulation serves the purpose of
the statute without substituting its own judgment for that of the agency. Absent such
a heuristic, courts risk undermining congressional intent by standing in the way of
rational regulations based on science, even if that science is not conclusive.
Allowing agencies to regulate in the face of uncertainty is one thing. Indeed,
prominent science and law scholars like Holly Doremus have long remarked that “it
is a truism that environmental-policy choices must almost always be made in the
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face of significant uncertainties.”383 The approach endorsed by Ethyl Corp., then,
seems quite in line with the practical necessities of environmental regulation.
If we accept the ethical exoskeleton of environmental law, and if we understand
that exoskeleton to state a preference for precaution, then we might go a bit farther.
We might call on courts not only to allow regulation in the face of uncertainty but
also to look skeptically on agencies that rely on scientific uncertainty to justify
inaction. That is the second part of the claim being made here. Admittedly, the
second part of the claim—that courts look skeptically on agency decisions not to
regulate when those decisions rely on scientific uncertainty—is a more aggressive
call. Nonetheless, it is necessary to ensure rational, non-arbitrary decision-making.
To see why, consider that scientific uncertainty is rarely a complete answer to
the question of whether to regulate. Science describes, but it does not prescribe.384 It
does not have normative dimensions. And so, though science is an indispensable
partner in environmental regulation, it is also an incomplete one. That means when
agencies decline to regulate, pointing to the inconclusiveness of science may be part
of the explanation, but it cannot be the entire explanation unless the statute itself
demands certainty. Rather, when agencies choose not to regulate, they must
ultimately root their decision in science as well as the normative dimensions of
environmental law.
More pointedly, when agencies work against the normative dimensions of
environmental laws by choosing not to regulate, they have a greater obligation to
explain why that decision is rational; hiding behind the proverbial “cloak of science”
is not enough.385 Joseph Sax, a giant in the environmental field, observed decades
ago that government inaction is not the end goal when it comes to environmental
law: “[P]ositive government involvement is essential in dealing with externalities
like pollution. There is no evident environmental principle analogous to the ‘hands
off’ principle that underlies basic human rights.”386
Similarly, when courts review environmental decisions as if it were simply a
review of science, putting too fine a point on whether there is enough evidence to
warrant regulation, they lose the idea that the science is only a partner in, and not a
substitute for, regulatory decision-making. When courts defer too readily to an
agency that holds up scientific uncertainty as a justification for inaction, the court
risks allowing the agency to cloak its decision in a standard not intended by
Congress—that is, certainty. Taking a hard look to avoid this kind of arbitrary
decision-making and ensure that agencies adequately heed the law’s ethical
commands is quintessentially the role of the courts.
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That courts take seriously this role (of ensuring scientific uncertainty isn’t used
as a technocratic ruse for otherwise arbitrary decisions) is even more important if
one considers the ways in which debates about science can overshadow the policy
goals of various environmental statutes. Wendy Wagner, in her article The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, critically examines the reasons why scientific
uncertainty stymies the implementation of environmental chemicals regulation.387
By engaging in what Wagner terms the “science charade,” agencies overinflate the
role that science plays in what is ultimately a policy decision.388 They do so, in part,
to minimize public participation and maximize deference by courts who are
uncomfortable wading into scientific debates.389
Wagner tells a particularly poignant story of the EPA’s decision not to regulate
formaldehyde during the Regan Administration, deliberately using scientific
uncertainty as a shield for regulation:
One of the best examples of Reagan’s premeditated charade is EPA’s
decision in 1982 not to regulate formaldehyde under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) because of the lack of conclusive data on the risk
formaldehyde presented to human health. EPA presented its decision as
based almost exclusively on science and insisted that risk assessment was
a scientific and not a legal matter. EPA’s supporting scientific
explanations, however, deviated significantly from both the prevailing
scientific evidence regarding health effects of formaldehyde and accepted
EPA risk assessment assumptions—deviations which EPA uniformly
failed to identify or explain. Close observers of the decision alleged that
EPA was simply manipulating science after-the-fact in order to justify a
predetermined political decision that would benefit an important
industry.390
This is precisely the kind of agency decision that would benefit from judicial
review of the type urged here—one where the science is clear enough and the
agency’s decision is suspect given the aims of the underlying statute. Those kinds
of decisions would benefit from a hard look review that trained a skeptical eye on a
387
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decision not to regulate and did not simply accept scientific uncertainty as a
complete answer.
Unfortunately, Wagner concludes that courts tend to exacerbate the science
charade by insisting on too much certainty and technocratic justification on the one
hand and on the other hand deferring too readily to agencies who frame their
decision in scientific terms.391 In other words, judicial review that is not properly
tuned risks perpetuating the charade, placing courts at the center of scientific
debates, and losing sight of the precautionary nature of the laws themselves. To that
end, because “the science charade impairs the essential progress and prioritization
of standard-setting by miring it in unresolvable scientific complexities,”392 ensuring
that judicial review is properly tuned to create appropriate incentives is critical to
the success of the laws.
Wagner is not the only scholar who has highlighted how the messy interstices
of science and policy empower agencies and diminish the effectiveness of judicial
review. Drawing on Wagner’s work, Jonathan Adler has argued that a similar
“science charade” undermines productive policy debates about species
conservation.393 In particular, he examines how the debate over the use of science in
the listing of endangered species “tends to obscure the dividing line between science
and policy and undermines the development of more effective and equitable
conservation strategies.”394 He argues that reforms focused on generating “better”
science or more robust judicial review of the science is not the answer given that the
questions of species conservation are answered by science alone.395
Similarly, Holly Doremus has explained why robust regulatory decisions
require both scientific and political integrity and how the latter depends on “being
explicit about places where the actor believes the governing law leaves room for the
agency to make policy choices, and openly acknowledging the choices made.”396 In
other words, ensuring political integrity would also seem to turn on the minimization
of the science charade.
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Together, the insights of these various scholars point to an approach to judicial
review like the one urged here—one that rebalances the appropriate weight that
claims of scientific uncertainty are given in agency decisions and creates a more
robust role for courts to ensure that scientific debates do not obscure the ultimate
policy aims of the relevant statute. In particular, consider the impact that the
approach urged here would have on the science charade or the political integrity of
decision-making: If uncertainty is not the death knell to regulation—that is, if
agencies are afforded flexibility in regulating in the face of uncertainty—agencies
would have a greater incentive to openly discuss the limits of science, courts would
play the more desirous and limited role of ensuring the ultimate policy decision is
rationally supported by science and serves the goals of the statute, and the
precautionary nature of environmental laws would be respected. By the same token,
if scientific uncertainty is not an automatic shield to an agency’s responsibility to
act, the agency has greater incentive to openly discuss policy motivations behind its
decision and courts have a greater ability to ensure that those policy decisions track
congressional intent.
Of course, any appeal to the precautionary nature of environmental laws will
be met with a degree of skepticism by those who see precaution as a tool for
unchecked regulation. Ironically, in doing so, the debate is once again centered on
questions unanswerable by science—thus the idea of precaution and the difficulty
of identifying a logical endpoint becomes a rhetorical tool for throwing one’s hands
in the air and ignoring that Congress has at many times put a thumb on the scale for
regulation in the face of uncertainty. Claims of overregulation, therefore, should not
be met with the same judicial skepticism as claims of under regulation. Another way
to think about it is that the precautionary nature of environmental law means that
courts are more likely to follow the intent of Congress if they are vigilant about
making sure regulators advance goals of environmental protection. If there is
asymmetry in how courts approach their review of regulatory decisions, then it is
appropriate for that asymmetry to skew towards precaution not against it.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in the aggregate and over a long period of time, one can start to
appreciate environmental law as a sort of “exoskeleton” that society has created to
protect itself from the collective action problems and the biophysical limits of nature.
Understanding the intentionality of environmental law—not as a wanton affront to
American frontier freedom, but as a deliberate and necessary act of providing for
future prosperity through self-restraint—is critical to the success of its
implementation. To see only part of the project or respect only some of the
commands; to pick only the low hanging fruit and turn a blind eye to difficult
problems; or to accept half-measures as full engagement—such failings will be the
downfall of the project as a whole.
Seeing the whole of environmental law is not sufficient to ensure its success.
The way that courts approach statutory interpretation and review of agency decisions
must reflect that deeper understanding of environmental law. To that end, courts, in
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their role as stewards of Congressional intent, should be placing interpretation in the
context of a statute’s enacted purpose statements, giving weight to the precautionary
nature of environmental law when agency’s make or avoid decisions in the face of
scientific uncertainty, and avoiding the impulse to frame issues with an overly
narrow view.

